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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-102(3)0) (2008).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on whether probable
cause existed for Defendants' arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff Jeff Howe under Utah's
false alarm statute? This Court reviews a summary judgment ruling for correctness,
viewing "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6, 177 P.3d 600.
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err in granting Defendants' motion for summary
judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' state law claims on the grounds that Plaintiffs' notice
of claim failed to meet the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? The
trial court's decision presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness.
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).2
ISSUE 3: Did the district court err in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on qualified
immunity? The trial court's decision presents a question of law, which this Court
reviews for correctness. Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1990).3

1

Preserved at R. 1048-50, 784-796, 2003-2014.

2

Preserved at/?. 1988-1990.

3

Preserved at R. 1994-2028.
1
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The central statute in this case is Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-501, "Making a False
Alarm." That statute provides:
76-9-105. Making a false alarm — Penalties.
(1) A person is guilty of making a false alarm if he initiates or circulates a report or
warning of any fire, impending bombing, or other crime or catastrophe, knowing that the
report or warning is false or baseless and is likely to cause evacuation of any building,
place of assembly, or facility of public transport, to cause public inconvenience or alarm
or action of any sort by any official or volunteer agency organized to deal with
emergencies.
(2) (a) Making a false alarm relating to a weapon of mass destruction as defined in
Section 76-10-401 is a second degree felony.
(b) Making a false alarm other than under Subsection (2)(a) is a class B
misdemeanor.
(3) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any
person convicted of a felony violation of this section to reimburse any federal, state, or
local unit of government, or any private business, organization, individual, or entity for
all expenses and losses incurred in responding to the violation, unless the court states on
the record the reasons why the reimbursement would be inappropriate.
Additional relevant statutes and other materials are provided in the Appendix.

2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff Jeff Howe ("Howe")
for allegedly making a false alarm by reporting to Salt Lake City police dispatch a
burglary in progress at West High School on the morning of June 27, 2003. Following
the dismissal of the criminal prosecution on a directed verdict with a finding the
prosecution had presented "no evidence" to show Howe committed the offense, Plaintiffs
filed this action for false arrest, malicious prosecution and civil rights violations.
Following discovery, the case came before the trial court on Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the lack of probable cause for the arrest and prosecution
and on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims.
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to show the
undisputed facts established a lack of probable cause as a matter of law. The trial court
granted Defendants' Motion, finding Plaintiffs' state law claims barred by the UGIA and
Plaintiffs' civil rights claims barred by qualified immunity.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

The Decision to Charge Jeff Howe with "Making a False Alarm" Occurred in
the Context of a Heated Public Debate Between Salt Lake City and the Alarm
Industry Over How to Deal with "False Alarms."
1.

For about the past 10 years, there has been an ongoing debate between Peak

Alarm and the alarm industry generally, on the one hand, and the Salt Lake City
government on the other, over the best way to address the problem of private security
alarms going off when there is no underlying crime. See generally R. 112-113.
3
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2.

Effective December 1, 2000, Salt Lake City adopted Ordinance No. 5.08.095,

creating a policy under which Salt Lake City police generally do not respond to alarms
unless someone at the scene verifies the alarm was caused by suspicious activity. R. 99091; 2273-2275 (definitions and penalties). The City refers to this as "verified response."
{See Appendix).
3.

After passing its "verified response" ordinance, the Salt Lake City Police

Department received substantial recognition and accolades for the program. According
to Defendant Shanna Werner, "[l]aw enforcement from the United States and Canada are
contacting our department daily" seeking assistance with false alarms, R. 2465, and Salt
Lake City has "won three national awards with our alarm program." R. 2452-2453.
Werner herself is "frequently asked to speak at conferences" regarding verified response.
R. 2518; 2262-63, 2282-83. Defendant Sergeant James Bryant worked on "verified
response" with Werner and accompanied her to some of these engagements. R. 2261-62.
4.

The Salt Lake City Police Department advocated that other cities adopt

verified response as well. R. 2518. By all accounts, in her official role as Alarm
Coordinator, Werner was a "zealous" advocate for "verified response." R. 2575, 2477.
5.

In opposition, representatives of the alarm industry, including Howe, as

chairman of a Utah-based alarm industry group, believed verified response was not the
best approach, voiced the alarm industry's opposition to "no-response" ordinances (its
term for "verified response"), and publicly advocated alternatives. 7?. 112, 2575.

4
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6.

As one example of its public advocacy, Peak Alarm was a signatory to a full-

page ad addressing the merits of verified response and urging citizens to contact their
mayor and city council, attend council meetings and air their views. R. 2312.
7.

Just a little more than a month before his arrest, Howe and another Peak

Alarm employee attended a meeting of the Murray City Council on the subject of verified
response. R. 1030. Werner and Bryant attended and spoke in favor of verified response.
Howe and the other Peak Alarm employee attended and advocated a different approach.
R. 1028-29.
8.

In the course of her advocacy, Werner repeatedly denounced the alarm

industry publicly:
a.

Werner told the Wall Street Journal that as far as she was concerned

"this whole alarm business is a scam." R. 2434-36.
b.

In a letter that appeared in the June 2002 issue of Security Sales

magazine, Werner stated: "It is so common within the alarm industry for emotion
to take control and a 'smoke-and-mirrors' approach to be used in an attempt to
cloud the issue." She also accused the industry of "selling a product" that "works
correctly only one percent of the time." R. 2439.
c.

Discussing Savannah, Georgia's consideration of the alarm issue,

Werner stated: "Alarm companies like to have free emergency response, with no
responsibility but to rake in that monthly monitoring fee." R. 1004-1007.

5
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d.

Werner told an alarm industry publication that it is a "shame the alarm

industry does not practice" honesty as the best policy, leaves customers "feeling
more violated than the burglar would have," and tries to "bully, threaten, and scare
and make the customer feel guilty." R. 1015.
e.

Werner told KSL News that the alarm industry was "preying on [the]

fears" of senior citizens, "selling them this alarm system as the panacea for all ills."
R. 2432.
9.

Werner's advocacy was fueled by encouragement from her supervisor, Bryant,

and her efforts were approved and facilitated all the way up the chain of command to the
Chief of Police. See, e.g., R. 2128; no number btwn 2363 and 2364; R. 2314-2321;
R. 2359; R. 2452-2453; R. 2450-53; R. 2455; R. 2461-63; R. 2490 at 25, 2491 at 26, 29,
2492 at 30; R. 2473-75; R. 2487 at 158-59.
10. Both Werner and Bryant used religious metaphors to characterize their and
their opponents' positions. See R. 2443 (Werner says, "It looks like Delaware is
preaching the 'gospel,'" and Bryant responds, "Spread the good word Shanna. Amen!");
R. 2445 (Werner says, "I often run across the stupid alarm companies giving us the
wrong address;" Bryant responds, "And, given our enlightened thinking, why were the
police even responding?????"); R. 2441 (In an email to Bryant regarding Howe's
criminal trial, Werner says "I am taking tomorrow off and Monday will be in court most
of the day for the day of reckoning for Mr. Jeffrey Howe.").

6
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11. Werner claimed to her supervisors, "I receive more complaints from Peak
Alarm customers, than all the other alarm companies put together." 7?. 2470. In her
deposition, however, Werner testified that was not true. R. 2391 at 288-89.
12. In addition to tarring the alarm industry generally and Peak Alarm
specifically, Werner and Bryant also deployed threats of litigation or prosecution. For
example:
a.

As far back as March 2000, Werner referred specifically to Utah's false

alarm ordinance in an industry publication
b.

After learning that the California Alarm Association wrote a paper using

statistics from Salt Lake City's own website, Werner threatened "Publication of this
paper will result in litigation." R. 2468.
c.

Werner characterized communications between the insurance and alarm

industries as "a conspiracy between those leaders in the industry and State Farm
leaders to go to City Council and try to force a reversal of verified response." Id.
(emphasis added). Rather than recognize this as protected First Amendment
activity, Werner wrote to the Utah Attorney General that the industry was part of a
criminal "conspiracy" to "defraud" the public and urged him to "investigate"
because she believed "if two large industries were planning to reverse a city
ordinance that perhaps he would like to investigate that." The Attorney General
determined that charge to be groundless, and urged Werner to retract it, but she
never did. R. 2344, 2465-66.
7
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d.

In an email sent shortly after verified response took effect, Werner

instructed Salt Lake City police dispatchers regarding what it would take to
prosecute an alarm company employee for giving false information. Specifically,
she told them that part of the case required that the operator "have the intent of
passing false information," and directed them to ask "a question that would
personally commit he or she [sic] would allow us to charge them [sic] criminally."
R. 2358.
e.

On another occasion, Werner threatened participants at an alarm industry

conference that she was "'looking to make a case against someone' in the alarm
industry for making a false alarm to police dispatch, and [that she] was determined
to have an alarm company employee arrested and prosecuted to send a message to
the industry." R. 2577; see also R. 2574-78.
f.

Giving a preview of what Salt Lake City would bring down on Howe

just weeks later, Bryant told the Murray City Council in June 2003 that if Murray
Police "were getting eight thousand calls, which was [Salt Lake City's] most recent
figure before verified response, from a group of citizens reporting crimes that did
not occur, they would have an ordinance that made it a crime to make a false police
report and given the resources they were committing they should have considered
prosecution in those cases." R. 1034.

8

B.

June 27, 2003: Peak Alarm Receives and Reports Burglar Alarms and
Verification of an Intrusion at West High School.
14. Plaintiff Peak Alarm is a local company that provides private security

services, including remote burglar alarm monitoring, for businesses, residences and
government entities. R. 109.
15. Jeff Howe is the son of Plaintiff Jerry Howe, the founder of Peak Alarm, and
was at all relevant times the Manager of Peak Alarm's Central Station, where Peak Alarm
remotely monitors its customers' alarms. R. 110.
16. Peak Alarm's customers include the Salt Lake City School District. R. 116.
17. On June 27, 2003, a day when school was not in session, Dianne Hoyt, the
lunchroom supervisor at West High, arrived at the school at about 6:30 a.m. to prepare
meals for a summer program. R. 1906-07.
18. As an authorized user of the alarm system at the school, Hoyt disarmed the
alarm for the areas where she and her staff would be working. Because no one besides
Hoyt and her staff were authorized to be in the school, she left the alarm engaged in areas
of the school where no one was authorized to be. R. 1907.
19. At 8:46 a.m., Peak Alarm's Central Station received multiple burglar alarms
triggered by motion sensors detecting intrusion in various areas of the school. R. not
numbered btwn 813& 814, 814, 815, 2054-55.
20. At 8:48 a.m., Hoyt called Peak Alarm from West High. Peak Alarm
dispatcher Brook Mills answered the call. R. 817-18, 840, 2054.
21.
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The following conversation ensued:
9

Hoyt:

Hi. We just had two people walk in and walk upstairs
and set the alarm off.

Brook:
Hoyt:
Brook:
Hoyt:
Brook:

Okay, so everything is okay?
Yeah.
Okay.
But I have no idea who the kids were that came in.
Oh really, they just walked in there and started setting it
off, huh?
Yeah.
Are they still there or did they leave?
They are still in here I guess. They went upstairs,
upstairs.
Yeah, we're getting [the alarm] on the second floor, on
the north media stairs.
So we don't even know who they are.
Okay. Do you want me to dispatch police or what do you
want me to do.
You know, I would, just to get them.
Okay... .

Hoyt:
Brook:
Hoyt:
Brook:
Hoyt:
Brook:
Hoyt:
Hoyt:
R. 840,

22. After hanging up with Hoyt, Mills tried to contact the "responsible parties" on
the Peak Alarm "call list" for the Salt Lake School District account, but she was unable to
reach them. She then called Salt Lake police dispatch. R. 818-21, 823, 824, 827-28.
23.

Salt Lake Police dispatcher Joann Ryan answered the call from Mills:
Mills: [T]his is Brook with Peak Alarm. I have a burglar alarm for
you at a business.
Ryan: Okay. You know we don't do burglar alarms.
Mills: Even if there are people inside and —
Ryan: That's right. If it's a panic alarm we go or a robbery alarm.
Mills: Well, what it is, is it's a school, it's West High and there is
people, teachers, a couple teachers and stuff inside. There's
been two kids that have run into the building and they have
not left the building yet. Would you guys respond on that
still or no?
10

Ryan: Only if they called us from the school and asked us to help
remove them.
Mills: Oh, okay.
Ryan: Yeah, burglar alarms - why would a burglar alarm go off if
there's people inside?
Mills: Because they're on the first floor and the kids went up to the
second floor.
R. 831.
24. After speaking with Ryan, Mills attempted to call Hoyt back to ask her to
contact the police directly, but there was no answer. R. 819-20, 824.
25.

Mills and her supervisor, Valerie Petersen, then approached Howe with what

they described as an emergency or panic situation - multiple alarms at West High; the
presence of unknown intruders with unknown intent; verification by someone at the
scene; and employees inside the school. R. 822, 1902-03.
26.

Howe then called Salt Lake City police dispatch himself. Ryan answered the

call from Howe:
Howe: This is Jeff with Peak Alarm Company. Hey, we have an
actual burglar alarm going off at West High, and I guess my
dispatcher just called up and said you guys weren't going to
go on an actual burglar alarm?
Ryan: No, we don't go on burglar - we haven't gone on burglar
alarms for two years.
Howe: This is an actual burglary in progress, it's been verified.
Ryan: No, she didn't say that, she said it was an alarm.
Howe: She said it was - okay. We actually have people inside and
my guard is asking for police assistance.
Ryan: Okay, that's what I needed.
R. 831.
27.

Ryan dispatched the call from Howe as a burglary in progress. R. 848, 859.
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28.

Ryan wrote in the dispatch log, "PER PEAK.. .PER PEAK GUARD.. .HAVE

2-3 KIDS...2 ND FLOOR...BURG ALARM DROPPED AT 846 HRS...STSG ["see the
security guard"] IN FRONT...IN UNIFORM." R. 850-56, 859.
C.

Salt Lake Police Respond to West High, Fail to Apprehend the Intruders, and
Instead Investigate Jeff Howe for Providing Incorrect Information to Dispatch.
29.

Seven Salt Lake City police officers, including Sean Wihongi, responded to

the scene; Wihongi headed the investigation. R. 861, 867-70, 883.
30. Based on the dispatch log, Wihongi believed that a Peak Guard was on the
scene and either had in custody or was pursuing two or three individuals. R. 873-74.
31.

Unable to locate a Peak guard, Wihongi asked police dispatch to seek

clarification from Peak Alarm. R. 832, 861.
32.

In the meantime, Howe had learned from his dispatchers that it was not a Peak

Alarm security guard, but a school employee, who had reported that the burglar alarms at
West High had been triggered by unknown intruders. R. 914-17.
33.

Police dispatch called at Wihongi's request to seek clarification:
Jeff:
This is Jeff, can I help you?
Dispatcher: Yeah, I was holding to find out if you know where a
guard is at West High school?
Jeff:
You know, actually it looks like there was a
miscommunication on our side as well. It was
actually the teachers that called in that wanted us to
respond or that wanted the police to respond because
they got kids running around.
Dispatcher: Uh-huh.
Jeff:
And they actually decided to call us, not to call, you
know, for them to you guys, and I believe they were
going to be waiting out front. But I think I have an
12
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inside number that I'm going to try to get a hold of
them.
Dispatcher: Okay. So you don't have a guard outside though,
right?
Jeff:
Yeah, we do not. I said that but that was my mistake,
I got it wrong from my dispatcher.
R. 832.
34.

Wihongi interviewed Hoyt, who confirmed her report to Peak Alarm that

unknown persons had entered the school and set off the alarm. R. 871-875f 894-95.
35.

Another officer reported to dispatch: "The cafeteria people here on the north

side are doing some loading and unloading and one of them here said that two teenage
girls went in the north doors here while these guys were here, and to gain access to the
building." R. 832.
36.

After a cursory search, R. 879, Wihongi did not further investigate the

reported burglary, but turned his investigation to Howe, concerned that Howe had
provided incorrect information to police dispatch and caused a substantial police
response. See 7?. 880-2.
37.

Wihongi interviewed Howe twice that day. At least one conversation was

recorded. R. 886-87, 888f 904-05.
38. Their recorded conversation included the following dialogue:
Wihongi: Thanks for calling me back, sir. I just wanted to clarify
something on the call in regards to the West High call
this morning.
Jeff:
Un-huh.
Wihongi: The information, and we talked about the
miscommunication coming through to dispatch.
Jeff:
Correct.
13
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Wihongi: Where did you get that information from, sir?
Jeff:
Okay. What originally happened was I had a dispatcher
telling me that there was kids out on a site that was
visually confirmed and that Wihongi: The call came in how Jeff:
No, this is my dispatcher talking to me. She goes, we
have some kids at West High and that they are, you
know - it's been visually confirmed that there's kids at
West High, and I tried to contact the police department,
they would not respond. What do you want me to do?
That's when I made the call quickly and then I said it
was a guard because on 90 percent of the alarms we
actually send a guard out, and I should have asked my
dispatcher a little bit more information which I didn't,
and the dispatcher should have told me no, it was a
teacher not our guard that actually did the visual
confirmation, so that was my error.
Jeff:

[Wjhen you have strangers you don't know running
through the place, that could be a potentially dangerous
situation. .. . Well then we tried contacting this Diane
again which, you know, she didn't answer the phone or
whatever, so we're like okay, what do we do now. And
that's when it was brought up to me and that's where I
was worried. And okay, we have police requesting or
we have an employee of the school requesting PD
assistance. And the way my dispatcher told it to me was
that the police weren't going to respond unless they
actually called it in.

Wihongi: When you talked to me you made a statement, Jeff, that
the dispatchers failed to send or failed to respond on
police services. And the actual quote that you have used
was whatever it took. And you talked about a panic
alarm.
Jeff:
Yes, and what I said is to me a panic alarm, this is our
definition at Peak Alarm, is someone's life could
potentially be in danger. We know we had an employee
there, we know we had people that were unauthorized to
be there. That to me is a potential danger for that
employee of the Salt Lake City School District.
14

Wihongi: Okay. And that was your interpretation. The dispatcher
led you to believe that someone was in immediate threat
or danger?
Jeff:
Yes, because they had unauthorized people within the
building that should not have been in there. And that
fits into our definition of what a panic alarm is.
Wihongi: [Y]our dispatcher did a good job, but it sounds like you
interpreted it wrong. Does that make sense?
Jeff:
No, because that's how they told me. Like I said, they
said that - in fact they used the word this lady is
panicking. That's how it was told to me, was that this
lady was panicking and I heard it from two dispatchers
that were, one that sat next to the other person. They
both used the word panicking.
Jeff:

And let me say this. If we're even charged for a false
alarm, I don't care I was just - hey, charge us if you
have to, we'll be glad to pay it. I was just worried about
this person being in danger.

R. 835-38.
39.

Later that day, Wihongi completed a police report. R. 861, 897-98 (See

Appendix).
40.

In his report, Wihongi wrote that in his initial conversation with Howe, for

which no recording or transcript has ever been produced, Howe had stated "whatever it
takes, I thought this was a panic alarm." R. 861, 887-889, 1523.
41.

Wihongi never listened to any of the recorded calls that are represented in the

transcript, though they were available. R. 892, 900-03.
42.

There are several errors in Wihongi's report, such as incorrectly stating, "Jeff

Howe with Peak Alarm stated to dispatch . . . that the guard had 2-3 kids on the 2nd level

15
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of the school/' when in fact it was Salt Lake City's own dispatchers who erroneously
conveyed that misimpression to the police. R. 1520.
43.

Wihongi's report also has omissions, such as Howe's explanation of why he

assumed a Peak Alarm guard had verified the alarm when in fact it was Hoyt. Id,
44.

Defendant James Bryant, Wihongi's supervisor, reviewed Wihongi's report

and spoke with Wihongi in the course of his supervisory responsibilities. R. not stamped
btwn 860 & 861, 929.
45.

Bryant "was the one that noticed what [he] felt was the violation." R. 2154.

46.

Bryant did no independent investigation, but relied on Wihongi's report and

his conversation with Wihongi, which simply confirmed for him what was in the report.
R. 952, not numbered btwn 952 & 953.
47.

Bryant also never listened to any of the taped calls or interviewed the Peak

Alarm dispatchers to find out what they had told Howe. R. 900, 939-40, 1903.
48.

Bryant added to Wihongi's report of the incident, stating in pertinent part:
I noted that AP Jeff Howe had provided false information to
SLCPD dispatch in order to get a police response to West High.
The false information provided was that an employee or agent of
Peak Alarm was on the scene, and that the employee or agent either
had contact with or knowledge of unauthorized persons on the
premises.

R. not stamped btwn 860 & 861 (emphases added).
49.

Werner also added to the police report, stating in pertinent part:
I returned from a three week absence to receive a phone call from
Sgt. Jim Bryant and an office visit from Communications
Supervisor Diane Powell [sic] advising me of an incident of
16
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emergency services abuse at West High School due to false
information given to police communications by Jeff Howe, the
Central Station Manager of Peak Alarm.
During my absence I had received an email from Jeff Howe with
audio clips of phone conversations between Diane Hoyt,
lunchroom worker for West High School and the Peak Alarm
Dispatcher. I listened to this audio clip several times. Jeff had
requested a return phone call from me. After listening to the
rationalization of his actions with Officer Wihongi, I felt a phone
call to him would result in more of the rationalization and
justification of which I had already heard. The mistruth by Jeff
Howe on the tape provided by dispatch was very evident and I felt
listening to more rhetoric was unnecessary.
R. 862-63.
50. Bryant and Werner discussed what city ordinances or state statutes might
apply to Howe's report of the incident at West High to dispatch. R. 2265.
51.

They "determined that two city ordinances were not applicable but a state

statute was." Id.; R. 2146.
52. According to Bryant, "The facts didn't easily fit any of the standard statutes
that we would use, and it took some . . . research on my part to determine what would
have been an appropriate statute." R. 2159 at 165. Bryant "did some .. . searching of
other statutes, probably based on a key word for false information, eventually came up
with the state code section that I cited Mr. Howe with." R. 2147 at 92.
53. Bryant testified that the false report statute "is probably most applicable, in
my view, to - maybe to bomb threats or something like that." R. 2157 at 131, 132.
54. In his 27 year history as a police officer, Bryant had never charged anyone
under the false alarm statute. R. 2157 at 131.
17
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55.

Likewise, "[t]he City is not aware of any other instance where an individual

has been charged by the City for making a false alarm" except for fines levied against
companies "for alarm technicians activating a false alarm" and "for false alarms
originating from remote key fobs .. .." R. 2282.
56. Bryant determined there was probable cause to believe Howe had violated the
false alarm statute based on (1) Howe's statement to police dispatch that an employee or
agent of Peak Alarm was on the scene, and (2) the information that employee or agent
either had contact with or knowledge of unauthorized persons on the premises. R. not
numbered btwn 860 & 861, 2147-48.
57. Bryant testified that "[Howe] had met the elements of this statute by claiming
that there was a guard on scene and that the guard had contact with suspects, which he
knew to be false, and that his intent in doing that was to elicit a response from the Police
Department." R. 2147 at 93.
58. Bryant emphasized that whether or not Howe said that there were two or three
kids in custody "wasn't ever my issue with this. It was the fact that there was no guard
on the scene." R. 2151 at 109.
59. Bryant contacted the city prosecutor's office, and criminal charges were
brought against Howe. R. 930, 931, 936.
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D.

Howe Had Reason to Conclude a Crime Was Occurring at West High, and Salt
Lake City Itself Admitted a Crime Occurred.
60.

Salt Lake City Police Department Dispatch Policies and Procedures define a

"burglary" as "breaking into, entering or remaining unlawfully in a building" with the
"intent to commit a crime against a person or property." R. 961.
61.

Ryan testified that a "burglary in progress" is "where a citizen has called in

believed that someone has entered a building without permission," that she would label a
call "a burglary in progress" if "there were unauthorized people in the building," and that
police dispatchers assume someone who is in a building, who is not supposed to be there,
is there unlawfully with criminal intent. R. 845-46, 849.
62.

Salt Lake City Police Dispatcher Tiffany Battad testified that, for a dispatcher,

in a similar position to Howe, "[t]here's really no way to figure out what [an intruder's]
intent is," that if a "business was closed and somebody was there, I could guess that
there's a criminal activity there," and that when in doubt about whether something is an
emergency, it is better to err on the side of caution. R. 2222-2225.
63.

Salt Lake City's own internal documents instruct that in responding to a

burglary alarm private security guards should "always assume that an alarm is a burglary
in progress." R. 950-951, 978.
64. Ryan testified that an alarm company can properly report a burglary if it's
been verified; the alarm company dispatcher does not have to witness the unauthorized
entry, but can relay information he or she has received from Ihe alarm company
customer. R. not numbered btwn 846 & 847, 847.
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65.

Ryan testified that "[wjhen an alarm company calls back and verifies that

there is a person on scene that's verified there has been a break-in or somebody actually
inside, then I would generate the call for service from police." R. 2218-19.
66. Werner testified that she has no information that Howe knowingly provided
false information to Salt Lake City police dispatch. 7?. 2378 at 234.
67. Wihongi testified that he did not conclude and has no evidence that when
Howe reported a burglary in progress that morning he knew it was false. R. 889-891.
68.

Similarly, Wihongi did not have and does not have any information that

indicates Howe was not genuinely concerned about the safety of persons at West High
School on the morning of the incident in question. R. 899.
69. Wihongi had no indication that Howe knew police response was unnecessary
or that there was no emergency at West High that morning. R. 910-11.
70. Wihongi had no information that would lead him to believe the information
4

Howe gave about Peak Alarm's definition of a panic alarm was false. R. 2087 at 126.
71.

Salt Lake City admitted a crime occurred that morning at West High, issuing a

press release stating: "This was a case of trespass." R. 2249.
According to a guide used commonly within the alarm industry, the Central Station
Alarm Association's Glossary of Terms, the term "panic alarm" relates to "a more
general type of perceived emergency, including the presence of one or more unruly or
inebriated individuals, unwanted persons trying to gain entry, observed intruders in a
private yard or garden area, or a medical emergency. Provides police with little specific
information, but is often the only way a user can call for assistance under abnormal
conditions." R. 1392-1393 at 12-14 ("our definition of panic is not that someone is
actually there with a gun, but someone's on-site that shouldn't be there"); R. 1917-18.
20
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72.

Bryant testified that he could "recall having at least one discussion with [a]

dispatcher . . . about, you know, the possibility that if it were - if it were someone local,
someone that we could have access to, under the right circumstances we might prosecute
them for providing false information" when alarm companies gave dispatchers "some
terminology other than burglar alarm, panic alarm, duress alarm, something that I
perceived as being made up in order to elicit a response from us . . . ." R. 2140 at 64.
73.

Police Dispatch Supervisor Powers testified that callers mischaracterize

crimes but that she knew of no circumstance in which a person, other than Howe, had
been prosecuted. R. 2228-33.
74.

Ron Walters, an individual with eleven years experience as a police officer,

stated "As a former police officer, I am incredulous that Jeff Howe would have been
charged with falsely reporting a burglary in progress based on those facts [that an audio
recording of Hoyt's call to Peak was available], because those facts make out the
elements of a burglary in progress." R. 2578.
75.

Likewise, John Mabry, a man with extensive experience in the security

industry, recognized that "[a]s the Central Station Manager on duty at the time, Jeff
Howe responded properly to the situation." R. 2242.
E.

Howe's Criminal Charges Were Dismissed on a Directed Verdict with a
Specific Finding of "No Evidence."
76.

During Howe's criminal prosecution, Werner stated "that she hoped Howe

would be found guilty. T m hoping for the enforcement of our ordinance that it goes
well,' she said. 'If the jury lets Peak Alarm off the hook, to me that's a signal to other
21
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alarm companies to call Salt Lake City police and tell them whatever you want.'"
R. 2523.
11.

Howe was tried in Justice Court on April 12, 2004, before Judge Paul Iwasaki.

R. 954-59.
78. The taped conversations were entered into evidence at trial, and a transcript
was produced. R. 955 (stating that "Dianne Hoyt. . . contacted Peak concerning the
alarms, which could be heard on the dispatch recording that was admitted into
evidence."); R. 830-40.
79. After hearing the prosecution's case and the tapes of the conversations, Judge
Iwasaki entered a directed verdict in favor of Howe. R. 954-55.
80. Judge Iwasaki also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 954-59.
Judge Iwasaki's Findings of Fact include:
[Diane Hoyt] informed Peak's dispatcher that there were two
individuals in the school who had activated the alarms and they
were not authorized to be on the premises. She did not know who
the persons were or what their intentions were. When Peak's
dispatcher asked if Mrs. Hoyt wanted her to dispatch the Salt Lake
City Police, Mrs. Hoyt answered in the affirmative.
[T]he two individuals reportedly inside West High School had
apparently exited the building by the time the police arrive[d]. At
least, the police were unable to locate them.
The witnesses and evidence presented by the City established that
there was an alarm at West High School, there were two
unauthorized individuals on the premises of West High School
which caused the alarm, and that no one knew what was the intent
of the individuals, including whether they intended to cause a theft
or commit a felony while in the West High School premises, and
that Mrs. Hoyt had asked for police assistance in removing the
individuals from the premises.
22

None of the evidence presented by the City established Mr. Howe's
intent at the time he contacted Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor
was there evidence presented by the City to establish that Mr.
Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations to Salt
Lake City dispatch.
Id. (emphasis added). {See Appendix).
81.

Judge Iwasaki's Conclusions of Law include:
1. The City has failed to produce any evidence establishing
criminal intent.
2. There has been no evidence presented that Mr. Howe
knowingly or intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake
City dispatch or made a false alarm as defined by Code Ann. § 769-105(1).

Id. (emphases added).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that Salt Lake City had
probable cause to arrest and prosecute Howe for making a false alarm. Prior to the trial
court's determination in this case, Judge Iwasaki found in Howe's criminal case that
Defendants had presented "no evidence" that Howe violated the false alarm statute, a
finding that satisfies Plaintiffs' burden on summary judgment to establish lack of
probable cause as a matter of law. At a minimum, that finding, and the other evidence
Plaintiffs proffered on summary judgment, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Defendants had probable cause. Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on whether
Salt Lake City's charging and prosecuting Howe under the false alarm statute was the
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culmination of a broader effort to squelch political opposition to Salt Lake City's
preferred approach to dealing with "false alarms." See infra at 24-34.
The trial court also erred in ruling that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the UGIA.
Plaintiffs' notice of claim complied with and in fact went beyond the requirements of the
UGIA, and it was timely served. See infra at 35-37.
Finally, the trial court also erred in ruling that Defendants are entitled, based on
qualified immunity, to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims.
The right to remain free from arbitrary arrest and prosecution without probable cause and
for the purpose and with the effect of punishing protected expression is clearly
established, and it is for a jury to determine whether Defendants violated that right. See
infra at 38-50.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS PROBABLE CAUSE ANALYSIS, AND
AS A RESULT IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS5 MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THAT ISSUE.
Plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit largely stand or fall on whether Defendants had

probable cause to believe that Howe violated the false alarm statute. Probable cause

Plaintiffs' false arrest claim requires that the criminal charge was "unlawful," which
means Defendants lacked probable cause. See Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile
Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 320 (Utah 1979) (defining test as "whether a reasonable and
prudent man in his position would be justified in believing facts which would warrant
making the arrest"), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc.,
678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). Lack of probable cause is an express element of Plaintiffs'
malicious prosecution claim. See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959
24

requires that the police and prosecution have "believable evidence" to support every
element of the crime charged. See State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App. 392, ^ 6, 174 P.3d
654. The threshold question is whether, as a matter of law, there was such evidence.
A.

Judge Iwasaki's Directed Verdict on the Underlying Criminal Charge
Against Howe Establishes Defendants' Lack of Probable Cause, Entitling
Plaintiffs to Judgment as a Matter of Law,

The issue of whether Defendants had "believable evidence" that Howe violated the
false alarm statute was definitively resolved before Plaintiffs initiated this civil action,
when Judge Iwasaki directed a verdict in the prior criminal action and made a specific
"finding of fact" that "[n]one of the evidence presented by the City established
Mr. Howe's intent at the time he contacted the Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor was
there any evidence presented by the City to establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or
intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch." R. 954-59 (See
Appendix). Based on that finding, Judge Iwasaki concluded: "There has been no
evidence presented that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations
to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false alarm as defined by Code Ann. § 76-5-101(1)."
Id.

(Utah Ct.App.1989) (identifying elements of malicious prosecution as: "(1) A criminal
proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination
of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the
proceeding; [and] (4) 'malice,' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an
offender to justice."). Some of Plaintiffs' civil rights claims similarly require a lack of
probable cause as the predicate for the civil rights violations. See Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352,363(1983).
25
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Longstanding precedent makes clear the effect of Judge Iwasaki's ruling here. In
Olson v. Independent Order of Foresters, 7 Utah 2d 322 (1958), this Court held that a
criminal defendant's acquittal "is evidence of lack of probable cause in a suit for
malicious prosecution because it tends to prove that the prosecutor did not have a
reasonable belief that a crime was actually committed." Id. at 325. Olson does not
expressly address the situation here, but if an acquittal creates "some evidence" of a lack
of probable cause, a directed verdict with an express finding of "no evidence" makes the
lack of probable cause conclusive. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at 1 13, 20 P.3d 300 (a
directed verdict means the prosecution failed to present "believable evidence of all the
elements of the crime charged.") (internal quotation and citation omitted). At a
minimum, a directed verdict makes out at a prima facie case sufficient to survive
summary judgment. SeeMcKenzie v. Canning, 131 P. 1172 (Utah 1913) ("The burden,
of course, was on the plaintiff to show want of probable cause. He, in that respect, made
out a prima facie case by showing his discharge in the criminal prosecution upon a
hearing and an investigation of the charge before the magistrate.").
The trial court failed to analyze this issue correctly. First, it erroneously concluded
that Olson only applies where the statute at issue includes a "defense provision." Ruling
at 4 (See Appendix). There is nothing in the language of Olson to support that
conclusion, and it makes no sense. Second, the trial court noted that the failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt cannot
estop a fact finder in a civil case from finding that those same elements were proven by a
26

lower standard. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiffs do not disagree. See, e.g., Johns v. Shulsen, 111
P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986). But that point is irrelevant here because Judge Iwasaki did
not acquit Howe, he dismissed the criminal action on a directed verdict with a specific
finding that the City had presented "no evidence."
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Judge Iwasaki's ruling constitutes conclusive
evidence of a lack of probable cause and entitles Plaintiffs to partial summary judgment.
Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence that Howe violated the
false alarm statute. They were unable to produce any evidence that he did so. The trial
court erred in allowing Defendants to relitigate that issue by insisting there was in fact
"believable evidence," even though the prosecution failed to marshal it for the criminal
trial. As a result, based on the very same set of facts, one Utah court ruled that there
existed no evidence that Howe committed the crime with which he was charged, while a
second Utah court ruled that there did exist evidence that Howe committed the crime with
which he was charged sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute probable cause to arrest
and prosecute him. To allow both conflicting results to stand would be deeply unsettling
to public confidence in the judicial process and the strong public policy in support of the
6

finality of judgments.

See, e.g., Robertson v. Campbell, 614 P.2d 1226, 1231 and n.2 (Utah 1983)
("Relitigation of the issue of undue influence in the second case should have been
precluded, and undue influence at the time of execution of the trust established as a
matter of law," citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, comment c (1982)).
27
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B.

Judge Iwasaki's Directed Verdict Constitutes Evidence of a Lack of
Probable Cause Which, in Light of the Statutory Language and the Other
Undisputed Material Facts, Requires Summary Judgment in Favor of
Plaintiffs or, at a Minimum, a Trial by the Jury.

Even if Judge Iwasaki's "no evidence" finding did not constitute conclusive
evidence that Defendants lacked probable cause, Olson makes it clear that the finding
constitutes some evidence that Defendants lacked probable cause. The question then
becomes whether that finding and other undisputed material facts entitle Plaintiffs to
partial summary judgment, or at a minimum create genuine issues of material fact.
Answering that question requires an analysis of the statutory language, a task Plaintiffs
urged as necessary but the trial court failed to undertake.
1.

The False Alarm Statute Can Only Be Construed to Criminalize the
Reporting of a Crime That the Person Making the Report Has No
Basis to Believe is Occurring.

As an initial matter, because the statute at issue is a criminal statute targeting
speech, the First Amendment requires that it be narrowly construed. "To avoid chilling
the exercise of vital First Amendment rights, restriction of expression must be expressed
in terms which clearly inform citizens of prohibited conduct and in terms susceptible of
objective measurement." /.ML v. State, 2002 UT 110,1J 25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citation and
internal quotations omitted).
The plain language of the statute also limits its proper application. First, the statute
is titled and uses the phrase "making a false alarm" {See Page 2). Clearly, pulling a fire
alarm to get a day off of school or calling in a bomb threat to get a thrill from the ensuing
evacuation and response would violate the statute. Equally clearly, an "alarm" cannot be
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"false" if there is some underlying basis for the "alarm," i.e., credible information about
an imminent or existing crime or catastrophe.
Second, while other statutes use the terms "information" or "statement," this statute
7

uses the broader term "report." A statute criminalizing any false "information" or false
"statement" might conceivably be read to refer to any individual piece of information.
The use of the broader term "report," however, indicates that the overall narrative or crux
of the matter recounted must be false, i.e., the overall report, and not just some isolated
8

item within the report, must be "false or baseless."
Third, the statute does not criminalize just any false report, but only a report "of any
fire, impending bombing, or any other crime or catastrophe." That same qualifier,
although not repeated, clearly applies to the intent element as well, meaning that it is the
See Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)
("The terms of a statute should be interpreted in accord with usually accepted
meanings.") Webster's primary definition of "statement" is "something stated: as a: a
single declaration or remark," whereas a "report" is "common talk or an account spread
by common talk." See http://www. merriam-webster. com/dictionary/statement;
http://www. merriam-webster. com/dictionary/report.
Numerous sections of the Utah Code prohibit and penalize false statements or false
information. "The department shall refuse to issue or renew a license if the applicant: . . .
has made a false or misleading statement. . . ." Utah Code § 4-7-7(5)(c). "No person
may knowingly . . . make any false statement to housing authority personnel. .. ." Id.
§ 9-4-612(1). "[A] municipality may remove a billboard without providing compensation
if.. . the applicant. . . intentionally made a false or misleading statement. .. ." Id. § 109a-513(2)(a)(i). "An athlete agent. . . may not (a) give any materially false or misleading
information . . . . " Id. § 15-9-114(1). Indeed, Salt Lake's "verified response" ordinance
has this feature. Bryant testified that in the effort to determine what Howe could be
charged with, he considered statutes and ordinances (including the "verified response"
ordinance) that criminalize false information or statements, and determined they do not
apply. See Statement of Facts ]ft[ 52-53.
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report of a "crime or other catastrophe" that the defendant must have known to be false,
9

and not the report of some tangential statement.
Important public policy implications also support a limited construction of the false
alarm statute. Because cooperation by members of the public, not to mention private
security companies, is increasingly essential to public safety, the law must also allow
reasonable room for error in making such reports. A broad construction of the false
alarm statute would cast a chilling pall over what must be a concerted community effort
to enhance public safety. In short, as a matter of constitutional law, statutory
construction and public policy, the false alarm statute cannot be read to impose criminal
liability for making any false statement to the police, only for reporting a crime without
basis to believe it is occurring.
As Judge Iwasaki correctly ruled, the undisputed material facts conclusively
establish that Howe had more than sufficient reason to believe a crime was occurring at
West High School on the morning of June 27, 2003.

Additional undisputed material

facts Plaintiffs proffered in support of their motion for partial summary judgment make
11

that even clearer.

12

Defendants have admitted that a crime did in fact occur.

Therefore,

See Kimball Condominiums Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake
County, 943 P.2d 642, 646 (Utah 1997) (looking to grammatical structure as an aid to
statutory interpretation).
10

See Statement of Facts, TJ 80, supra.
See Statement of Facts,fflf24-25, 60-75, supra.
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Defendants cannot have reasonably concluded that Howe had no basis to believe a crime
was occurring at West High School on the morning in question.
The only "facts" Defendants relied on for their probable cause determination - that
Howe told police dispatch a uniformed Peak Alarm guard was present at the scene, that
he "should have known" no Peak Alarm guard was present, and that he allegedly
admitted he was willing to say "whatever it takes" to secure a police response - are
immaterial to the requisite mens rea under this statutory interpretation.
13

As to the "guard" statement, although the evidence is to the contrary, this Court
can assume that Howe "should have known" there was no Peak Alarm guard on the
scene. The fact that Howe "should have known" this detail was false does not mean he
knew it was false; it establishes only negligence in failing to gather additional
information, or at most recklessness, neither of which is sufficient to support a reasonable
14

belief that he had the requisite mens rea.

Moreover, Howe's statement that there was a

Peak Alarm guard is immaterial to the core fact justifying police response - that the

See Statement of Facts, \ 71, supra. Defendants have not argued, nor could they, that
liability should attach to a mischaracterization of the underlying offense - otherwise,
anyone who reported an "assault" when the facts established a "battery" instead would be
subject to criminal liability for making a "false report."
See Statement of Facts, TJ 38, supra.
14

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (defining criminal states of mind).
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alarm was verified. Ms Hoyt, an "alarm user" within the definition of the "verified
response" ordinance, was a "guard" on the scene.
As to the "whatever it takes" statement, this Court can assume that Howe was
willing to say whatever it took to get a police response, but that goes only to his intent to
get the police to respond, a separate element of the crime charged. No reasonable person
would conclude from that statement that Howe knew his report of a crime was false. On
the contrary, the most reasonable conclusion to draw from Howe's insistence that the
police respond is that he genuinely believed there was an emergency at West High
requiring a police response.
Given the foregoing, a proper interpretation and application of the statute, and an
analysis of Howe's allegedly inculpatory statements shows Judge Iwasaki was correct:
there is "no evidence," let alone "believable evidence," that Howe violated the statute.

The verified response ordinance, Salt Lake County Ordinance 5.08.095, provides
"Except for alarms at a wholesale or retail firearms business, intrusion alarm response
shall be dispatched by the police department only after a private guard responder has
confirmed that an attempted or actual crime has occurred at the alarm site." R. 2275.
The ordinance defines "private guard responder" as including "an alarm user, or a person
or entity appointed by an alarm user to be responsible to confirm that an attempted or
actual crime occurred at an alarm site." R. 2273 (emphasis added). Bryant understood
that a "private guard responder" as used in the ordinance, is not limited to a "uniformed
security guard" and that it may be "the alarm user." R. 2152 at 113. Dispatch Supervisor
Diane Powers testified that she understood that the Ordinance required a guard or a
person at the scene to verify the alarm. R. 2230-31.
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2.

The Totality of the Circumstances Creates, at a Minimum, Genuine
Issues of Material Fact as to Whether Defendants Had Probable
Cause.

Finally, if this Court were to find that the Constitution, rules of statutory
construction and public policy permit Defendants' reading of the statute to criminalize
virtually any false statement made in the course of reporting a crime even //the person
had a reasonable basis to believe a crime was occurring, that would not be the end of the
analysis. The question would then be whether there are genuine issues of material fact as
to whether Defendants reasonably concluded that Howe knew his statements were false,
or unreasonably rushed to that judgment based on their admitted desire to prosecute an
alarm company employee for making a false alarm in order to send a message to the
alarm industry.
The trial court acknowledged that a criminal defendant's "knowledge or intent is a
state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the
accompanying circumstances. " Ruling at 10-11 (citing and quoting State v. Ingram,
2006 UT App 237, ^ 17, 139 P.3d 286). In its analysis of the totality of the
circumstances, however, the trial court committed one error after another in concluding
that not only had Plaintiffs failed to establish the lack of probable cause as a matter of
law, but Defendants had established probable cause as a matter of law.
First, the trial court acknowledged but disregarded as "immaterial" the undisputed
facts that Plaintiffs put forward facts showing that Howe had every reason to believe a
crime was in progress at West High School on the morning of June 27, 2003. Ruling at
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23 n.21. The trial court then recited what it considered the 12 "material" facts, which
have nothing to do with whether Howe knew any statement he made to police dispatch to
be false. At most, some relate to whether was careless in assuming a Peak Alarm guard
was on the scene and people were in danger, or knew his report would trigger a police
response. Finally, the trial court misread the pertinent case law, however, to exonerate
Defendants for ignoring evidence they knew was available.
What the court's "probable cause" determination boils down to is an assumption
that because Howe allegedly said to Wihongi, "Whatever it takes," he must have been
making the report for the thrill of seeing the police respond or the building evacuated.
But it strains credulity, given the information Howe had at the time, to think he was
saying he wanted the police to respond whether or not people were in danger. Indeed,
Wihongi testified he had no information that led him to believe Howe was not in fact
17

worried about people being in danger, precisely as Howe explained.

Based on all the

facts, a jury could conclude that just as Defendants stretched the statute beyond
recognition to criminalize Howe's report, they also stretched "probable cause" far beyond
reason to mount a malicious and unconstitutional case. That is the gravamen of
Plaintiffs' case, and it should be addressed at trial, not on summary judgment.
16

See Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
police officers could not rely on a security guard's assertion that a security video showed
a customer shoplifting without viewing the video themselves and that officers "may not
ignore available and undisputed facts" in their probable cause determination.).
17

See Statement of Facts, ^| 38, supra.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT.
The trial court ruled that all of Plaintiffs' state law claims must be dismissed

because Plaintiffs' notice of claim, served on Defendants pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq., failed to meet
18

the requirements of the UGIA. Ruling at 12-14, 15-17.
A.

That ruling was clear error.

The Notice of Claim Was Sufficient to Alert Defendants to the Nature of
Plaintiffs' Claims.

The trial court correctly noted that the version of the UGIA applicable to the acts
giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims in this action permitted suits against government
employees when they act with "fraud or malice/' and that this Court has recently held
that "[w]hether a notice of claim contains an allegation of fraud or malice depends on the
content of the notice as a whole, not on the use or nonuse of particular words." Ruling at
12 -13 (citing and quoting Mecham v. Frazier, 2008 UT 60, ^j 20). In Mecham, this
Court made it clear that "the UGIA does not require that a notice of claim against state
officials in their individual capacity expressly aver 'fraud' or 'malice.'" Id. at ^f 19.
The trial court also ruled that Plaintiffs' state constitutional claims must be dismissed,
even though not subject to the UGIA's notice of claim requirements, because they do not
establish the necessary "flagrant violation," i.e., "a violation of'clearly established'
constitutional rights 'of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Ruling at 14-15
(citing and quoting Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc. of Box Elder County Sch. DisL, 2000 UT
87, TI23, 16 P.3d 533). The trial court's cursory ruling appears to be based on its analysis
of probable cause, discussed above. Because that conclusion was erroneous, the
conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue of material fact on whether
Defendants' actions constitute "flagrant violations" of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights is
also erroneous.
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Instead, the plain language "requires that a notice of claim contain only (1) 'a brief
statement of the facts,' (2) 'the nature of the claim asserted,' and (3) 'the damages
incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.'" Id. Moreover, "a plaintiff need only
include enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so that the
defendant can appraise its potential liability." Id. {quoting Houghton v. Dept. of Health,
2005 UT 63, If 20, 125 P.3d 860). A notice of claim "meet the standards required to state
a claim for relief." Houghton, 2005 UT 63, \ 19.
The trial court failed to correctly apply these precedents, ruling that Plaintiffs'
notice of claim was deficient because it "fail[ed] to assert any claims of fraud or malice
against Defendants in their individual capacities." Ruling at 14. That statement is simply
incorrect. Although not required to do so, Plaintiffs' notice of claim actually uses the
"particular word" - "malicious" - and actually sets forth specific claims for relief,
19

including the elements of each claim.

Plaintiffs' notice plainly complies with the

statutory requirements as elucidated by this Court. It contains a statement of the facts; it
identifies the claims asserted and it makes clear they are directed against individual
defendants; and it addresses damages. Read as a whole, the notice of claim clearly sets
forth the core claim against the individual Defendants, particularly Werner and Bryant 19

See Appendix at #5 ("Salt Lake City and its officers, agents or employees" retaliated
against Howe for the purpose of "maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted
under the United States and Utah Constitutions"; they also engaged in "malicious
prosecution" by mounting a criminal prosecution against Howe for a "primary purpose
other than bringing an offender to justice" - the very definition of "malice" for purposes
of a malicious prosecution claim).
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that they viewed Plaintiffs as part of a criminal enterprise, bore them tremendous ill will,
and as a result brought to bear the full power of law enforcement and the criminal justice
system for the improper purpose of sending a clear message that companies such as Peak
Alarm had to play by their rules. The trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs' notice
of claim was insufficient to allow Plaintiffs to present that claim to a jury.
B.

The Notice of Claim Was Timely.

The trial court ruled that Plaintiffs' state law claims must be dismissed for the
additional reason that their notice of claim was allegedly untimely. Ruling at 15-17.
That ruling was also clear error.
As the trial court correctly stated, the UGIA requires a notice of claim to be served
within one year of when the cause of action arises. Id. at 15 n.9. The trial court then
discussed the underlying chronology, concluding that "Plaintiffs had until July 30, 2004,
to file a notice of claim...." Id. at 16. The court then inexplicably refers to Plaintiffs'
Complaint, noting it was filed on April 7, 2005. Id. at 17. While that is true, it is
irrelevant to the timeliness of the notice of claim. Plaintiffs served their notice of claim
on June 25, 2004, and trial court's discussion of the underlying chronology establishes
20

that Plaintiffs' notice of claim was timely.

20

The trial court's perplexing discussion of the timeliness of Plaintiffs' notice of claim
makes more sense in relation to Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' false arrest claim is
barred by the statute of limitations. Although not addressed by the trial court, that
argument is wrong. Defendants rely on a 1977 decision of this Court, Tolman v. K-Mart
Enterprises, 560 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1977), to assert that a false arrest is complete on the
date of the arrest. However, a 2007 United States Supreme Court case, Wallace v. Kato,
37
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE
ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THEREBY DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS.21
A.

Plaintiffs Adequately Alleged a Fourth Amendment Unreasonable
22
Seizure Violation.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be secure from unreasonable
seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Any seizure greater in scope than a Terry stop is
"reasonable only if supported by probable cause." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
363 (1983).
In this case, the trial court ruled, "the Court as a matter of law determined that
Plaintiffs failed to show that Defendants acted without probable cause." Ruling at 23.

594 U.S. 384, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007), makes it clear that the false arrest tort continues so
long as the defendant has not had "legal process," which is an objective finding of
probable cause. Id. at 389. In this case, Howe was not given such a determination until
he was tried on April 12, 2004. This case was filed April 5, 2005. R. 1. Accordingly,
the complaint was timely. This Court did not consider in Tolman when the plaintiff
received "legal process," and as such it must be construed in light of Wallace v. Kato.
21

The trial court set forth the standard for qualified immunity (that the defendants'
action violated a clearly established right). Ruling at 20. Ultimately, the court
summarily concluded that the Defendants "are entitled to qualified immunity." Ruling at
34. However, the ruling contains no analysis to connect the standard with the conclusion.
See Ruling 18-34. In fact, the ruling appears to dismiss Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims
not because the rights were not clearly established but for various other reasons discussed
herein. In fact, the rights claimed are very much clearly established. See, e.g., Strepka v.
Sailors, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1226 (D. Colo. 2007) (right to be free from arrest without
probable cause); Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 584 (6th Cir. 2007) (the right to be
free from malicious prosecution); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 13 Fed. Appx. 560, 562
(9th Cir. 2001) (unpub.) (rights embodied in stigma plus claim clearly established).
22

The trial court "considered]" Plaintiffs' unreasonable seizure claim "under the Fourth,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Ruling at 21. However, Plaintiffs argued only that
the Fourth Amendment applies to the unreasonable seizure. See R. 1994-95.
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That, however, improperly reverses the burdens. Because this ruling was based on
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Defendants had the burden of proving that
they did have probable cause as a matter of law. As discussed above, Defendants did not
have probable cause as a matter of law, but in the alternative, at a minimum, it is a
23

question of fact, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that issue.
The trial court also ruled that there was no seizure in this case. Ruling at 23-25.
Plaintiffs argued that Jeff Howe was seized for four reasons: (a) Jeff Howe was not free
to leave when Bryant detained him, (b) Bryant physically grasped him, (c) Jeff Howe
assented to Bryant's show of authority, and (d) Bryant seized Jeff Howe's identification
for an extended period. R. J994-95. The trial court ruled that the issuance of a
misdemeanor citation is not a seizure, under Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th
Cir. 2007), and that "Plaintiffs failed to show that Bryant's actions [in taking the
identification] were anything other than an unintended act," Ruling at 25.

"[T]he determination of reasonableness and probable cause is a question of fact for the
jury to decide" if there is a dispute "concerning the principal facts." Terry v. Zions Co-op
Mercantile Assoc, 605 P.2d 314, 321 (Utah 1979) (rev. on other grounds by McFarland
v. Skaggs Co., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984)). In this case, to rule that Bryant did in
fact have probable cause, the trial court would have to consider all of the inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence available to Bryant. Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir.
2007). From that, the trial court would have to rule that Bryant reasonably believed that
Howe knew that there was no burglary in progress (or, depending on this Court's
construction of the statute, that Howe actually knew the falsity of factual errors that he
made or that in saying "whatever it takes" Howe was expressing not that he genuinely
believed that there was an emergency but that he wanted a police response simply to get a
police response).
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The trial court erred in its reliance on Martinez. The facts of Martinez are
inapposite because the defendant officer played a very minor role in the events
constituting the plaintiffs allegations. 479 F.3d at 1295. In this case, Sergeant Bryant
very centrally contributed to the illegal acts against Howe. Aware of Werner's attitude
about the alarm industry and with his own biases, Bryant consulted with Werner about
what charges to bring, made the decision to cite Howe, told Howe that he was under
arrest, physically grasped him, and detained his driver's license for at least several hours.
Moreover, the plaintiff in Martinez had been subject to a "preexisting detention" prior to
the defendant officer's involvement, and therefore, the defendant officer's involvement
did not in itself trigger the seizure. Such is not the case here.
The trial court also erred in ignoring the other ways in which Plaintiffs alleged a
seizure. A seizure is made in several circumstances, including when: (a) an individual
complies with an officer's show of authority, (b) in circumstances in which a reasonable
person would believe that they were not free to leave, and (c) when the person is
physically grasped by the officer. "[T]he police can be said to have seized an individual
only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 573 (1988). "To constitute an arrest, however-the quintessential 'seizure of the
person' under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-the mere grasping or application of
physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee,
was sufficient." California v. HodariD., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)). The "slightest
40
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application of physical force" constitutes an arrest. Id. at 625. "'A Fourth Amendment
seizure occurs when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied/" Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). In
this case, Bryant showed authority and Jeff Howe complied, and Jeff Howe was not free
to leave. R. 943-44. Bryant physically grasped Jeff Howe's hand during the
fingerprinting, and Bryant kept Jeff Howe's identification for an extended period of time.
R. 1918. Because Jeff Howe was in fact not free to leave, he was seized within the
constitutional meaning.
B.

The Trial Court Failed to Rule on Plaintiffs5 Fourth Amendment
Malicious Prosecution Claim, Which Was Improperly Dismissed.

The trial court recognized that Plaintiffs argued that prior to trial, a constitutional
malicious prosecution claim falls under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore does not
require the "shocks the conscience" element of the Fourteenth. Ruling at 25). However,
the trial court offered no more analysis or ruling on this claim. Presumably, though, the
court believed that it failed on the probable cause issue. Again, this presumption ignores
that on their summary judgment motion, Defendants had the burden of proving probable
cause as a matter of law, whereas the trial court only ruled that Plaintiffs did not prove
the lack of probable cause.
Plaintiffs properly stated a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on
malicious prosecution. The elements that are in issue of this claim are: (1) "the defendant
caused the plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecution," Novitsky v. City of Aurora,
491 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007), (2) lack of probable cause, id., and (3) "malice or a
41
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primary purpose other than that of bringing the offender to justice," Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 494 (1994) (Thomas, J. concurring); see also Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 786 F.2d 950, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing the same definition). The fact
that Bryant issued the citation with Werner's support or encouragement suffices to cause
the initiation of the prosecution. See Novitsky, 491 F.3d at 1258. In addition, Werner and
Bryant set in motion the facts that led to Plaintiffs' injuries. As to the last element, all
that is necessary at this stage is that Plaintiffs show a genuine issue of material fact that
Defendants acted with a primary purpose other than to bring Howe to justice. Plaintiffs
met that burden by adducing evidence regarding Werner's attitudes toward the alarm
industry and her express desire that someone be "investigated" for discussing efforts to
lobby to repeal the verified response ordinance, and both Werner and Bryant's expressed
desire to prosecute a member of the alarm industry. See Statement of Facts Y§ 9> H> 13,
13d, 66. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution claim.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims For Insufficient
Pleadings.

The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
"stigma plus" Fourteenth Amendment claim and on Plaintiffs' non-retaliatory First
Amendment claim on the basis that they were not sufficiently pled in the complaint.
Ruling at 25, 33. The trial court erred in relying on Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT
38, ]f 31, 48 P.3d 895, because it takes an overly harsh view of the liberal pleading
standards. The trial court's reliance on that case would require plaintiffs to specifically
42
e-7i i \i

i

identify the sub-category of the constitutional violation or to give the defendants a
roadmap of their legal theories. However, "[a] plaintiff is required, under our liberal
standard of notice pleading, to submit a 'short and plain statement showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and 'a demand for judgment for the relief.' The plaintiff
must only give the defendant 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Code v. Utah Dept. of
Health, 2007 UT App 390, H 4, 174 P.3d 1134 (alternation and citations omitted).
Moreover, constitutional claims are given particular lenience. In L.K. v. Gregg, the
Minnesota Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs "failed to plead their claim
with sufficient specificity" where the plaintiffs alleged a violation of their due process
rights but did not reference 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 413 N.W.2d 833, 835, 837 (Minn. App.
1987). The state supreme court reversed, ruling "the better practice would be for the
court to look at the substance, rather than the form, of the underlying action." 425
N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. 1988). In so holding, the court recognized that "[t]he U.S.
Supreme Court has required only two allegations to state a cause of action under section
1983. A plaintiff must allege: (1) that a person has deprived him or her of a federal right,
and (2) that the person so depriving acted under color of state law." Id. (citing Gomez v.
24

Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).

Therefore, Plaintiffs were required only to provide

In Calhoun v. Thomas, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2005), the court
permitted a claim to proceed where the plaintiff had not even alleged the correct
constitutional amendment on which the claim was based.
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only fair notice and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. Their
complaint more than adequately does so.
1.

Plaintiffs Adequately Pled a Stigma Plus Claim.

A Fourteenth Amendment "stigma plus" claim arises when there is proof of a
defamatory statement "that was published [and] was: (1) false; [and] (2) stigmatizing; and
(3) that some further interest was adversely affected." Gardetto v. Mason, 854 F.
Supp.1520, 1535 (D. Wyo. 1994); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976). In
this case, Plaintiffs set forth Werner's defamatory statements in detail in the complaint,
R. 113 -115, and alleged that they were false, R. 78 %1,82^ 18, 84 \ 22. The statements
are stigmatizing as a matter of law because they imply dishonesty or immorality. Brady
v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1556 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he law was clearly established that []
a liberty interest was implicated when an employee was stigmatized by charges of
immoral or dishonest conduct."). Finally, the arrest constitutes the adversely affected
fiirther interest. See Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that allegations of false statements made in connection with an illegal arrest
constitute a defamation plus claim) (abrogated on other grounds by City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). In this case, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fourteen
Amendment (R. 122 at ^ 44; See Appendix,), and Plaintiffs set detailed facts that support
the "stigma plus" claim. Accordingly, plaintiffs gave defendants "fair notice" of their
claims and sufficiently pled the Fourteenth Amendment stigma plus claim.
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2.

Plaintiffs Sufficiently Alleged Their Non-Retaliatory First
Amendment Claim.

In addition to the claim that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by
retaliating against Plaintiffs for Plaintiffs' protected First Amendment acts, Plaintiffs also
have a claim that Werner violated Plaintiffs rights through her own government speech.
Simply stated, this claim is that government is entitled to take a political position on its
own policies and to use its powers to promote its policies. However, government speech
25

can go too far. Government cannot use its power to deprive Plaintiffs of a right.

In this

case, the Defendants, as government, have taken and strongly expressed particular
political viewpoints. However, they have gone too far in calling Plaintiffs liars and

"The First Amendment protects citizens' speech only from government regulation;
government speech itself is not protected by the First Amendment." N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt,
891 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990). It is thus well settled that the government may not
abridge "equality of status in the field of ideas" through viewpoint discrimination in
forums. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). The government
may not monopolize the "marketplace of ideas." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Also, the government may not compel individuals to support
or promote causes, candidates or ideologies. Lanthrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 873
(1961) (Black, J. dissenting); see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1566. The
common thread is that the government cannot use its power to force its viewpoint upon
others or to drown out opposing views, particularly when the government itself has
chosen to address a public policy matter. The government can of course have a
viewpoint on a matter of important public policy such as public safety. The government
can promote its viewpoint. But, the government cannot quash other viewpoints. Indeed,
"[restrictions on government speech seem to spring from one ideal: Tf there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.'" N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891
F.2d at 1565 {quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
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871113 1

impugning Plaintiffs' integrity. The effect is that Defendants have chilled Plaintiffs' and
others' free exercise of constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs' complaint specifies that Werner's "tactics and methods have included the
development and implementation of a wide-ranging public campaign that features
exaggerated, misleading and/or false statements against the alarm industry itself and
individuals within the industry," R. 82 \ 18, and it details Werner's public comments.
The complaint describes that "[t]he purpose and effect of this campaign have been to
unfairly and seriously malign Peak Alarm a n d , . . . to send a chill over the expression of
legitimate viewpoints on an important matter of public interest. Ms. Werner, Sgt. Bryant
and others acting in their individual and official capacities on behalf of Salt Lake City
have taken even more aggressive action in their campaign, going well beyond vigorous
advocacy and false and misleading statements to even more egregiously illegal and
unconstitutional actions." R. 84 U 21-22. Moreover, in their section 1983 claim,
Plaintiffs specifically invoked the First Amendment. R. 122^47.

Plaintiffs state that

defendants not only "retaliate[d]" but also "and deprive[d], inhibited] and punish[ed]"
Plaintiffs free exercise "by seeking to restrain [Plaintiffs] from . . . expressing and
advocating their viewpoint on the subject of 'no-response' ordinances while Salt Lake
City remained free to express and advocate its own competing viewpoint on the same
subject." Id.

Yet, the trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on

26

There is ample evidence that Werner systematically and over an extended period,
publicly defamed Plaintiffs and those associated with them, and that she did so in her
46
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this issue because "such claims will not be considered as they were raised for the first
time in Plaintiffs' Opposition." Ruling at 33. As discussed above, this grossly
exaggerates the liberal pleading standards embodied in the rules. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8.
Plaintiffs' complaint gives fair notice to defendants of their non-retaliation First
Amendment claim, and the trial court erred in dismissing this claim.
D.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs5 Substantive Due Process
Claim.

The trial court ruled that "Plaintiffs failed to show any extreme conduct against any
Defendants including Defendant Werner" and thereby dismissed Plaintiffs' substantive
due process claim. Ruling at 27. The trial court indicated that "conscience shocking"
conduct "'typically involve[es] some violation of physical liberty or personal physical
integrity.'" Ruling 26-27. But, "'malicious and sadistic' abuses of power by government
officials, intended to 'oppress or to cause injury' and designed for no legitimate
government purpose, 'unquestionably shock the conscience."' Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d
75, 94 (2d Cir. 2005). "This is so because our constitutional notion of due process rests
on the bedrock principle that we must protect the individual 'against the exercise of
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental

official capacity as alarm coordinator of Salt Lake, with the full authority of the Salt Lake
Police Department behind her. R. 2336 at 51, 1004-1007. For example, Werner testified
that she sent the Attorney General letter "[a]s alarm coordinator," R. 2465-66, and that
she saw it as within her responsibilities to attack the alarm industry over what she saw as
unfair contract provisions. Even if Defendants had never arrested Howe, they still
violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by using the force of their authority to chill free
expression and to defame Plaintiffs.
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objective.'" Id. {quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998))
(alteration omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs have developed substantial evidence that
would enable the jury to conclude that Defendants intended to punish Jeff Howe for his
political speech, as Shanna Werner put it, to send "a signal to other alarm companies."
Such motives are unjustifiable by any legitimate government interest and, therefore,
shock the conscience. As such, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' substantive
due process claim.
E.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims Against the City
and Supervisor Defendants.

The trial court recognized that Plaintiffs alleged that Werner "engaged in a 'pattern
of tortious conduct'" through her string of defamatory statements. Yet, the trial court
dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against the City and official capacity defendants because it
ruled "Plaintiffs failed to identify a policy or custom that caused their injury." Ruling at
28. This ruling, however, fails to recognize that demonstrating a continued "pattern of
tortious conduct" itself evidences a constitutionally violative policy or custom. "The
existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to
show that the lack of proper training . . . is the 'moving force' behind the plaintiffs
injury." Board of County Comm 'nrs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
407-08 (1997). In this case, in addition to showing the undisputed pattern of defamation,
Plaintiffs also showed that the supervisor defendants continuously failed to discipline
Werner despite her violations of City policy and her defamatory statements. In fact, they
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encouraged her. Chief Atkinson told her, "I like it," R. 2455, and Bryant told her "Spread
the good word Shanna. Amen!" R. 2443.
Regarding Plaintiffs' claims against Dinse and Atkinson, the trial court determined
that "Plaintiffs sole claims against Defendants Dinse and Atkinson" are encompassed in
paragraph 27 (R. 118) that Dinse and Atkinson made it clear to Jerry Howe that they
27

authorized and approved Ms. Werner's conduct. Ruling at 30.

The trial court

considered the additional specific allegations against Dinse and Atkinson "conclusory
and immaterial." As a result, the trial court ruled that "Plaintiffs failed to show any
causal connection between Dinse's and Atkinson's actions as supervisor's [sic] and
Werner's and Bryant's alleged unlawful and malicious actions." Ruling at 31.
A plaintiff must show "an 'affirmative link' between the supervisor and the
violation, namely the active participation or acquiescence of the supervisor in the
constitutional violation by the subordinates." Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections,
455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs demonstrated that Dinse and Atkinson
participated in and encouraged Werner's conduct. Dinse called an alarm industry group
"unscrupulous," R. btwn 2363 and 2364, and Atkinson encouraged Werner to give the
industry "hell," R. 2455. Moreover, they never disciplined Werner but stood by her
performance. R. 2486 at 107, 2484 at 89, R. 2463 at 61, 63. Those allegations are
27

However, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint also alleges, "one or more individual
Defendants failed to take action they were required to take to properly supervise their
subordinates and stop their unlawful and malicious actions, in a manner that amounts to
deliberate indifference." R. 122 \ 46.
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sufficient to survive summary judgment that Dinse and Atkinson acquiesced or
participated in Werner's conduct.
CONCLUSION
Defendants lacked probable cause to charge and prosecute Jeff Howe for making a
false alarm. If there is a question about that, it must be resolved by a jury in light of the
totality of circumstances, including the evidence that Defendants were motivated not by a
desire to bring an offender to justice, but by a desire to advance a political agenda by
silencing opposing voices. Such a shocking abuse of state power cannot be viewed as per
se reasonable. Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling.
DATED this Jjfcjfoy

of February, 2009.

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC

Stephen C. Clark
Kathleen E. McDonald
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Salt Lake City Justice Court

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SA1 I 1 AKE CITY JUSTICE COl >R I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CITY OF SALT LAKE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Case No. 03 CR 11570
MICHAEL JEFFREY HOWE,
Judge Paul F. Iwasaki
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on Monday, April 12, 2004. Paul
Curtis of the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office represented Salt Lake City. Richard A. Van
Wagoner and Trystan B. Smith represented the defendant Michael Jeffrey Howe ("Mr. Howe").
The Court heard the testimony of the following witnesses - Dianne Hoyt, Joann Ryan, Tiffany
Simpson, Diane Powers, Shaun Wihongi, and Chuck Smith - and reviewed the exhibits that were
admitted into evidence. At the close of the City's case in chief, Mr. Howe moved the Court to
dismiss the Information on a number of grounds, both in writing and orally

i lie ( OHM in -mi

argument and considered defendant's Motion to Directed Verdict, which it granted from the
bench. Based upon the foregoing, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Salt Lake City School District ("SLCSD") has a contract with Peak Alarm Co.

("Peak") pursuant to which Peak provides certain security services for SLCSD schools, including
West High School. Certain nt these srrvuvs tm Itidt the use of remote motion sensonrtfj alarms.
On June 27, 2003, when school was not in session and no unauthorized individuals were
permitted on ih< premises, certain of these motion sensoring alarms were activated at West High
School in Salt Lake City, Utah. Shortly thereafter, Dianne Hoyt, an employee of the Salt Lake
City School District, contacted Peak concerning the alarms, which could be heard on the dispatch
recording that was admitted into evidence. She informed Peak's dispatcher there were two
individuals in the school who had activated the alarms and they were not authorized to be on the
premises. She did not know who the persons were or what their intentions were. When Peak's
dispatcher asked if Mrs. Hoyt wanted her to dispatch the Salt Lake City Police, Mrs. Hoyt
answered in the affirmative.
2

Peak's dispatcher contacted the Salt Lake City Police Dispatch and informed it of

the call from West High School. The police dispatcher said Salt Lake Police would not respond
to the call, even though there had been visual confirmation of the two individuals, unless the
client itself made the call to Salt Lake City Police Dispatch. Shortly thereafter during the
morning of June 27, 2003, the defendant Michael Jeffrey Howe contacted Salt Lake City Police
-2-

dispatch lequesting that the Sail I \lt City Police respoit I in (lit ILIIIII af Wrsi High S< lionl and
informing police dispatch they had been unable to reestablish contact with the client.
3.

Short h thereafter, several Salt Lake City Police officers arrived at West High

School and attempted to intercede with what may have been a burglary in progress. However,
the two individuals reportedly inside West High School had apparently exited the building by the
time the police arrive. At least, the police were unable to locate them. However, the Salt Lake
City Police officer in charge of the investigation spoke with Mrs. Hoyt who again confirmed that
two unauthorized individuals had entered the premises and set off the alarms.
4.

On July 25, 2003, Salt Lake City filed a criminal Information against Mr. Howe

allegitfg4ir*h#dcommitted the public offense of violating the Utah State Code, Making a false
alarm, specifically, section 76-9-105(1). The original Information charged Mr. Howe with
committing a Class B misdemeai 101 whuli upoin omiUion, otihl result in a punistininii ol i
term not exceeding six months and a fine of up to $1,000 plus an 85% surcharge, for a total of
$1,850.
5.

Mr. Howe demanded a trial by jury. On December 8, 2003, the City filed an

Amend H Information allying Mi Howe had \ tolatccl tin identical >l tic u>de provision, but
amending the Information to an infraction instead of a Class B misdemeanor, which could result
inafni<j ot up to $ 7S() 00 plus an K'>% aiuhaige, ioi a total ol it»3K/ M)
6.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1), the single count of the Amended Information,

required thai I lit ( ity prove against Mr. Howe the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt
in order to convict him of the crime as charged:
-3-

A person is guilty of making a false alarm if he initiates or
circulates a report or warning of any fire, impending bomb, or
other crime or catastrophe, knowing that the report or warning is
false or baseless and is likely to cause evacuation of any building,
place of assembly, or facility of public transport, to cause public
inconvenience or alarm or action of any sort by any official or
volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies.
(Emphasis supplied.)
7.

The witnesses and evidence presented by the City established that there was an

alarm at West High School, there were two unauthorized individuals on the premises of West
High School which caused the alarm, and that no one knew what was the intent of the
individuals, including whether they intended to cause a theft or commit a felony while in the
West High School premises, and that Mrs. Hoyt had asked for police assistance in removing the
individuals from the premises. The evidence presented above was undisputed.
8.

None of the evidence presented by the City established Mr. Howe's intent at the

time he contacted Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor was there any evidence presented by the
City to establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations to Salt
Lake City dispatch.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Therefore, the Court hereby concludes:
1.

The l 'ih has iiiiinl in pioducc .my evidnict rstablishmg aumiuil mlent.

2.

The City has not met the necessary elements to prove Mr. Howe violated Utah

Code \ n n §76-9 -105(1)

-4-

3.

There has been no evidence presented that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally

made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false alarm as defined by Code
Ann. § 76-9-105(1),
4.

Accordingly, the defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict is hereby granted.

SO ORDERED.
MED this V

day of

^^/^^

, 2004.

BYTHECOU^^,

Paul F. Iwasaki
Justice Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Paul A. Curtis
Salt Lake City Prosecutor ""s Office

-5-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached instrument was mailed on the

4-

day of April, 2004, on the following:
Paul A. Curtis
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
349 South 200 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,
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CASE NO. OJ CRllf .'(l

MICHAEL JEFFREY HOWE,
DEFENDANT.

TRANSCRIPTION OF DISPATCH RECORDINGS

INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS
5885 HOLSTEIN WAY
Murray, Utah 84107
263-1396
File No. 91703
TRANSCRIBED BY:
LINDA J. SMURTHWAITE, RPR
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i
DISPATCHER: Is ,uat because of the kids?
3 "~ PEAK ALARM: I would assume.
4
DISPATCHER: And where do we meet your guard at?
5
PEAK ALARM: Just in thefrontof the schooL
6
DISPATCHER: Is he in uniform or she?
7
PEAK ALARM: Yes, he is.
8
DISPATCHER: Alrighty.
9
PEAK ALARM: And you got the address right? 244
10 North 300 West?
11
DISPATCHER: Un-huk
12
PEAK ALARM: Okay. Thank you.
13
DISPATCHER: Un-huk
14
PEAK ALARM: Do you have an incident number or a 15 not a - yeah, an incident number?
16
DISPATCHER: 471.
17
PEAK ALARM: Okay, thank you.
18
DISPATCHER: You bet
19
PEAK ALARM: Bye.
20
(New call).
21
DISPATCHTl^ce dispatch, Joanne.
22
PEAK ALARM- Hi Joanne, this is Brook with Peak
23 Alarm. I have a burglar alarm for you at a business.
24
DISPATCHER: Okay. You know we don't do burglar
25 alarms any more?
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PEAK ALARM This is Jeff with Peak Alarm Company,
Hey, we have an actual burglar alarm going off at West
High, and I guess my dispatcher just called up and said
you guys weren't going to go on an actual burglar
alarm?
DISPATCHER: No, we don't go on burglar - we
haven't gone on burglar alarms for two years.
PEAK ALARM: This is an actual burglary in progress,
it's been verified.
DISPATCHER: No, she didn't say that, she said it
was an alarm.
PEAK ALARM: She said it was - okay. We actually
have people inside and my guard is asking for police
assistance.
DISPATCHER: Okay, that's what I needed.
PEAK ALARM: Okay. And I'll talk to her about that
just to clarify that, but no, this is an actual
break-in.
DISPATCHER: Okay, and how many, how many?
PEAK ALARM: They said two or three kids.
DISPATCHER: Where at?
PEAK ALARM: Didn't get that information just the
alarm's coming from the second floor, but they're
running throughout the whole building.
DISPATCHER: What time did the alarm drop?

1
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PEAK ALARM: Even if there are people inside and DISPATCHER: That's right If ifs a panic alarm we
go or a robbery alarm.
PEAK ALARM: Well, what it is, is if s a schooL
it's West High and there is people, teachers, a couple
teachers and stuff inside. There's been two kids that
have run into the building and they have not left the
building yet Would you guys respond on that still or
no?
DISPATCHER: Only if they called us from the school
and asked us to help remove them.
PEAK ALARM: Oh, okay.
DISPATCHER: Yeah, burglar alarms - why would a
burglar alarm go off if there's people inside?
PEAK ALARM: Because they're on thefirstfloor and
the kids went up to the second floor.
DISPATCHER: Yeah. What you need to do is call the
responsible to respond, and if they need us to assist
then call us. We can't respond on burglar alarms any
more.
PEAK ALARM: Okay, thank you.
DISPATCHER: Un-huh.
PEAK ALARM: Bye.
(End of tape)
TAPE2
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11
OFFICER: - you say the security v , in the front
12 of the school?
13
DISPATCHER 11)1 III says he's in a uniform J oil
14 hell be in front
15
OFFICER: 104, I don't see him there (inaudible).
16
DISPATCHER: 101 68.
17
OFFICER: The cafeteria people here on the north
18 side are doing some loading and unloading and one of
19 them here said that two teenage girls went in the north
110 doors here while these guys were here, and to gain
111 access to the building.
112
DISPATCHER: 104. Do you see the Peak security
113 guard in the rear at all? He's not out front?
114
OFFICER: Nof I'm with one of the nutrition,
115 cafeteria people here on the north side.
116
OFFICER: 459. I did not see him in the back
117 parking lot area.
[18
DISPATCHER: 104.
119
OFFICER: (Inaudible) he's not on the south side
120 either can you call him back and get his location?
21 Pause.
22
(Welcome to Peak Alarm company this phone call may
23 be recorded for quality purposes. Please wait a moment
24 and a representative will be with you in a moment)
25
PEAK ALARM: Good morning, Peak Alarm.
6
11
DISPATCHER: Hi, this is Salt Lake City police
12
calling. One of your people there called in that there
13
was a burglary at West High at241 North 300 West, and
14
that you had a Peak Alarm guard that was there.
15
PEAK ALARM: Okay. Let me put you through to our
I 6 central station. One moment
I7
DISPATCHER: Okay. 242, stand by, you're next
18
Pause.
J9
DISPATCHER: I'm on hold with them, Pant I J10
PEAK ALARM This is Trisha, how may I help you?
111
DISPATCHER: Trisha, this is Salt Lake City police
112 calling. Somebody there called in an alarm at West
113 High school
114
PEAK ALARM: Right
115
DISPATCHER: Your guard, do you know where your
J16 guard is? He's not in front, we're faying to find him.
117
PEAK ALARM Hold on a moment
118
DISPATCHER: 161 stand by, number two. Oh my gosh,
119 this is ridiculous.
120
PEAK ALARM This is Jeff, can I help you?
121
DISPATCHER: Yeah, I was holding to find out if you
|22 know where a guard is at West High school?
123
PEAK ALARM: You know, actually it looks like there
124 was a miscommunication on our side as well It was
125 actually the teachers that called in that wanted us to

I

•
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS(801);

I 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
! 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

respond or that waste
police to respond because
they got kids running around.
DISPATCHER: Un-huh.
PEAK ALARM: And they actually decided to call us,
not to call, you know, for them to you guys, and I
believe they were going to be waiting out front But I
think I have an inside number that I'm going to try to
get a hold of them.
DISPATCHER: Okay. So you don't have a guard
outside though, right?
PEAK ALARM Yeah, we do not I said that but that
was my mistake, I got it wrong from my dispatcher.
DISPATCHER: Okay, all right that's fine. No
problem. But was there an alarm that did go off, or
was it just the teachers calling it in?
.
PEAK ALARM There was an original alarm and we were
tiying to contact an RP to go down. Later on, like
about, you know IS minutes later the teachers called
back saying hey the alarm went off, we're here but
there's kids running around, we want some police here
to help us because they don't have any panic alarms
there.
DISPATCHER: Okay. You know, they're telling me
that they do want a guard out there, could you have one
I
go that way, or.
I
81
PEAK ALARM Yeah, we could probably get someone out!
there if you want to. But like I say, this was the
I
teachers calling it into us as a panic alarm and
I
they're worried because they have kids running around
I
DISPATCHER: Okay. Yeah, the officers are saying
they do need a guard to go out there, so do you know
I
about how long it would take someone to get there?
I
PEAK ALARM Probably about IS minutes.
I
DISPATCHER: Okay. Is there a number that I call
you at directly?
I
PEAK ALARM Let me ask you this, I got a question.
I
Why do we need a guard out there when it's a panic
I
alarm? I mean, it was originally an alarm, burglar,
J
but now I have the teachers calling in saying it's a
I
panic alarm. I don't know if our guard should be
I
responding to a panic alarm.
I
DISPATCHER: Okay. Well, you know, the oflicrr did
ask, but hold on just a minute please.
1
PEAK ALARM Okay.
OFFICER: Delta 581 I've arrived at West, III be
on the north side.
I
DISPATCHER: That's a 582 at 9:05.
OFFICER: I'll be out on the far corner.
I
DISPATCHER: 9:06. (Inaudible) burglar in progress.
Be advised on we're on hold now with Peak Alarm.
J
91
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1
OFFICER: Alpha 12L When you ge'
>Id of them,
2
have them send their officer on the north aide of the
3
building.
4
DISPATCHER: 1 0 1
5
OFFICER: Alpha 161fs arrived, Tm on the west part
6
DISPATCHER: At 9:07. Alpha 121?
7
OFFICER: Go ahead.
8
DISPATCHER: 121, n o w they're saying their guard's
9
no longer there, do you want him to come back out?
10
OFFICER: Yes. Alpha 121,101
11
DISPATCHER: 121,1 have the Peak Alarm guy on the
12 phone right now, do you have just a second for an
13 update?
14
OFFICER: Yeah, go ahead
15
DISPATCHER: 1 0 1 He said that when he initially
16 called he gave us the wrong information. There was an
17 alarm that had gone off, but it was a panic alarm done
18 by the teachers there, so there is no guard on scene.
19 Like I said, I do have him on the phone. He can have a
20 guard respond in IS minutes, but he doesnt - he's
21 asking me why they need to go and I basically said just
22 send them.
23
OFFICER: Okay. So this is a panic alarm, this is
24 not a burg drop is that correct? If he did not see
25 anyone?
10
1
DISPATCHER: H e said that the teachers there at the
2
school did see some kids go in, so they did it as a
3
panic alarm.
4
OFFICER: You have him respond to the scene. He's
5
given us mixed up information, w e l l clear it up with
6
him down here.
7
Pause.
8
DISPATCHER: Are you there?
9
PEAK ALARM: Un-huh.
10
DISPATCHER: Okay, s o n y about that I was faying
11 to talk to the officer to get more information. He
12 just - he really says he does need a guard to come
13 down.
14
PEAK ALARM: On a panic alarm?
15
DISPATCHER: Un-huh.
16
PEAK ALARM: Could you give me Dianne?
17
DISPATCHER: Yeah, hold on just a second.
18
DISPATCHER: Dianne speaking.
19
PEAK ALARM: Yeah Dianne, this is Jeff from Peak
20 Alarm.
21
DISPATCHER: Hey.
22
PEAK ALARM: Okay. I'm finding out a little bit
23 more, I think my dispatch screwed up on telling me
24 certain stuff as welL
25
DISPATCHER: Yeah, I think so. I listened to th<

1 tape.
2
PEAK ALARM: Yeali H v.asnlf oui piaid il wasthr
3
teacher that called i n
i
DISPATCHER: Thafs right
'/
PEAK ALARM: The teacher whose name is Diane H o y t
6
DISPATCHER: Of course you know we wouldn't go on
7
that.
8
PEAK ALARM: On?
9
DISPATCHER: Atearhersa>inf, thrMc'< kids m [he
10 schooL
11
PEAK ALARM: You wouldn't?
12
DISPATCHER: Not as a burglar alarm
13
PEAK ALARM: No, no, no, no, no, but she's
14 requesting police as a panic alarm now
15
DISPATCHER: Well, panic alarm we certainly would
16 never go OIL That is not - a panic alarm means she's
17 being held at gun point and being robbed, that's a
18 panic alarm and we didn't receive a panic alarm,
19
PEAK ALARM: Okay. Just because our terminology
20 might be different, our definition of panic is not that
21 someone is actually there with a gun, but someone's
22 on-site that shouldn't be and you also have another 23
DISPATCHER: That would be a burglar alarm then
24 correct?
25
PEAK ALARM: N o ,
12
1
DISPATCHER: Yeah, because panic means there's a
2 weapon involved and someone's life is being threatenecL
3
Okay? And ifs not semantics because you're an alarm
4
company.
5
PEAK ALARM: Okay. Our terminology is different
6 We have a dient asking for police to respond because
7 there's kids in the building that aren't authorized to
8
be there.
9
DISPATCHER: But that's not how il was giveii to ui10 it was given to us as a burglar alarm.
11
PEAK ALARM: Okay. But I just described this to
12 your last dispatcher and she's saying that we need a
13 guard there.
14
DISPATCHER: Yeah. What happens is officers are ail
15 over the place and they're demanding a guard come d o w n
16 and you guys are saying no.
17
PEAK ALARM: We d o n t sendguards on panic alarms.
18
DISPATCHER: It's not an alarm.
19
PEAK ALARM: Yes, it is, our definition.
20
DISPATCHER: It's the same scenario. When an
21 officer requests your guard to respond on what you gave
22 us as a burglar alarm, then you need to get a guy down
23 there.
24
PEAK ALARM: That's what I'm saying. This isn't a
? T burglar alarm any more, this is a citizen requesting PD

11
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113 all over?
114
PEAK ALARM- No. They said they wouldn't go without 1 1 4
15
115 a guard. That's what I'm trying to get is someone out
16
116 there.
17
117
DISPATCHER: Okay. Jeff, let me just tell you, when
1 18
118 you talked to Joanne personally a log was made as a
1 19
119 burglary in progress, officers are all.over West High,
20
120 officers are there saying get me a guard. Thafs what
21
121 we're saying to you and your guard and your person said
22
122 no we will not send you a guard.
123
PEAK ALARM: Dianne Hoyt, the teacher, is asking
23
124 police response, okay?
24
125
DISPATCHER: Do you think we're there? Do you think
25
14 |
I I
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
110
1 11

response because - call it trespassir
°nifyou
want to.
DISPATCHER: Un-huh, but that's not what the officer
is saying. He's saying he wants a guy.
PEAK ALARM: But that's what I'm telling you now,
could you get someone on a trespassing?
DISPATCHER: If you said a citizen's calling we're
relaying for (inaudible) at West High.
PEAKALARM: T h e y n o w DISPATCHER: At West High.
PEAK ALARM: Thafs what I'm saying now.

I 1
I 2
1 3

we're at West High?
PEAKALARM- Now you're telling me yes, but the
other person said no, they would not respond without a

J4

guard.

J5
DISPATCHER: That was the first person your first
1 6 person said to.
1 7
PEAKALARM: I just barely got off the phone saying
1 8 they're requesting a guard to respond, or the police
1 9 will not I just barely got off the phone with them.
110
DISPATCHER- That was Tiffany. Tiffany just said to
111 you what? What do you think she said?
112
PEAK ALARM: She said the police are requesting a
113 guard.
114
DISPATCHER* That's right, because we were there.
115
PEAK ALARM: Oh, she didnt state that or at least
116 if she did I didn't understand it because she said
117 they're requesting a guard, they're not going to do
118 anything without a guard. That's how I understood it
119 to be.
120
DISPATCHER Okay, so obviously it's a
121 misunderstanding.
122
PEAKALARM: Okay. So.
123
DISPATCHER We are there, we are requesting a
124 guard.
25
PEAK ALARM That's all I wanted was to get police

1

out there, rhafsallf
ted
I
DISPATCHER: Poi^e have been out there since your
first cill
PEAK ALARM: Okay, that's all I wanted to clarify.
Thank you so much.
DISPATCHER: So you're sending a guard, right?
PEAKALARM: Huh?
DISPATCHER: So you're sending a guard, correct?
1
PEAK ALARM: We don't send them in this type of
situation.
DISPATCHER: So you are not sending a guard?
PEAK ALARM: We are not sending a guard.
DISPATCHER: Okay, 111 tell the officer that
PEAKALARM: Thank you.
DISPATCHER: Bye, bye.
Pause.
1
DISPATCHER: See what it does. Okay, there's ring
1
one.
1
(Welcome to Peak Alarm company. This phone call may 1
be recorded for quality purposes. Please wait a moment
1
and a representative will be with you in a moment)
1
PEAKALARM: Good morning, Peak Alarm.
1
OFFICER WIHONGI: Good morning, is Jeff Howe
1
available?
1
PEAK ALARM: He's out of the office right now. If
16

1 you'd like, I can put you through to his voice mail or
1
2 is there somebody else who can help you?
1
3
OFFICER WIHONGI: Actually I need to talk to him.
I
4 This b Officer Wihongi, Salt Lake City police
I
5 department Is there another manager that's available?
1
1 6
PEAKALARM: Hold on just one moment
I
7
OFFICER: WIHONGI: Thank you. (Hold).
1
PEAKALARM: Sir?
1
1 8
OFFICER WIHONGL Yes, ma'am.
1 9
10
PEAK ALARM: I'm going to send you to Garth Wheeler. 1
OFFICER WIHONGI: Garth Wheeler?
1 11
1 12
PEAKALARM: Garth Wheeler. One moment, please.
OFFICER WIHONGI: Okay, thank you.
1 13
PEAK ALARM: This is Garth, can I help you?
I
1 14
OFFICER WIHONGI: Mr. Wheeler?
I
1 15
PEAKALARM: Yeah.
1
1 16
OFFICER WIHONGI: Officer Wihongi, Salt Lake City
1 17
1
1 18 police department
PEAK ALARM: Who am I talking to?
1 19
OFFICER WIHONGL This is Officer Wihongi from the 1
1 20
21
Salt
Lake police department
1
1
PEAKALARM: Okay.
1 22
OFFICER WIHONGI: I - 1 actually wanted to talk to
1
J 23
1
1 24 Jeff, and he is apparently out of the office; is that
1 25 correct, sir?
|
171
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so I don t keep tabs on him, bur ^ ..at's what they
told you then I would believe that
OFFICER WIHONGI: Okay, 1 apologize. I just needed
to follow up with him on an incident that happened this
morning, and actually I - probably, yeah, I can't get
it secondhand, I just probably need it from him. Could
I leave you a phone number, sir, that he can get a hold
of me later on today if he gets back in the office?
PEAK ALARM: How do you spell your last name?
OFFICER WIHONGI: It's Wihongi, W-I-H-O-N-G-I, and
first name is Shaun, S-H-A-U-N.
PEAK ALARM: This is an alarm that went off or what?
OFFICER WIHONGI: Yes, an alarm this morning.
PEAK ALARM: Okay.
OFFICER WIHONGI: In regards to a West High school
alarm.
PEAKALARM: Oh. Okay.
OFFICER WIHONGI: And if he can call dispatch, they
can get a hold of me.
PEAK ALARM: Give me that phone number, sir.
OFFICER WIHONGfc 799-3000.
PEAK ALARM: Now, Ray Hicks, our operations manager,
he's over central station, can he call ya?
OFFICER WIHONGfc Actually I just need to talk to

i

Jeff in regards to statements that he had made to me.
PEAK ALARM: Oh, he already talked to you then?
OFFICER WIHONGI: Yeah, he already talked to me this
morning about a situation. But yeah, 111 touch base
with him if he's able to give me a calL
PEAK ALARM Glad to help out
OFFICER WIHONGI: No, and I much appreciate it, sir.
PEAK ALARM Okay.
OFFICER WIHONGI: Thank you, sir.
PEAK ALARM: All right
OFFICER WIHONGI: Bye.
PEAK ALARM* Bye.
Pause.
PEAK ALARM (Welcome to Peak Alarm company—)
PEAK ALARM: Good morning, Peak Alarm.
DISPATCHER: Hi, this is Joanne, Salt Lake police
department
PEAK ALARM Yes.
DISPATCHER: We were just verifying what kind of an
alarm we got at 8:57 today at West High School, 241
North 300 West
PEAK ALARM Let me put you through to our central
station.
DISPATCHER: Thank you.
PEAK ALARM: One moment.
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help you?
DISPATCHER: Valley, Joanne with Salt Lake police.
How are you?
PEAK ALARM: Good.
DISPATCHER: You guys called us on an alarm to West
High school at 241 North.
PEAK ALARM: Correct
DISPATCHER: 300 West
PEAK ALARM: Right
DISPATCHER: Could you verify what kind of an alarm
you guys gave us?
PEAK ALARM: Hold on here.
DISPATCHER: Thank you.
PEAK ALARM: Okay. Burg on the second floor north
media stairs was the original alarm, but there was
multiples on it, so.
DISPATCHER: Okay. Multiples, okay. I got the
first alarm drop at 8:46; is that correct?
PEAK ALARM: That's correct
DISPATCHER: Okay.
PEAK ALARM: All right
DISPATCHER: Thank you so much.
PEAKALARM: Thankyou.
DISPATCHER: And that was a multiple burglar alarm?
21

PEAK ALARM: Right, I got the whole north or second
floor went into alarm, so.
DISPATCHER: Okay. All right Thank you so muck
PEAKALARM: Okay.
Pause.
(Welcome to Peak Alarm company—)
PEAK ALARM: Good morning, Peak Alarm.
OFFICER WIHONGI: Good morning, this is Officer
Wihongi Jeff Howe, Officer Wihongi with Salt Lake
City police, Jeff Howe had just left me a number to
give him a call back, can you transfer me to his
office?
PEAK ALARM: Sure, may I have your name again?
OFFICER WIHONGI: Officer Wihongi, Salt Lake city
police.
PEAK ALARM: One moment please.
PEAKALARM: This is Jeff, can I help you?
OFFICER WIHONGI: Hey Jeff, Officer WihongL
PEAKALARM: Yes.
OFFICER WIHONGI: Thanks for calling me back, sir.
I just wanted to clarify something on the call in
regards to the West High call this morning.
PEAKALARM: Un-huh.
OFFICER WIHONGI: The information, and we talked
about the miscommunication coming through to dispatch.
21
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OFFICER WIHONGI: There wis ini *ation about an
officer being on scene that was requesting police.
PEAK ALARM: Correct
OFFICER WIHONGI: Where did you get that infonnation
from, sir?
PEAK ALARM: Okay. What originally happened was I
had a dispatcher telling me that there was kids out on
a site that was visually confirmed and that OFFICER WIHONGI The call came in how PEAK ALARM: No, this is my dispatcher talking to
me. She goes, we have some kids at West High and that
they are, you know - it's been visually confirmed that
there's kids at West High, and I triedtocontact the
police department, they would not respond What do you
want me to do? That's when I made the call quickly and
then I said it was a guard because on 90 percent of the
alarms we actually send a guard out, and I should have
asked my dispatcher a little bit more information which
I didn't, and the dispatcher should have told me no, it
was a teacher not our guard that actually did the
visual confirmation, so that was my error. Thaf s
where that mistake came from because I assumed it was
our guard, which made an ass out of me, rather than a
teacher that had actually called it in. I originally
22
- so when I was calling back saying hey, we have
visual confirmation that it is - that kids are in
there that should not be in there and why aren't you
dispatching a police officer at that moment? And then
she asked and I assumed, I go well, you know, it's our
guard which I assumed, which I was wrong. That came
from me and that was my mistake. When the visual
confirmation actually came from a teacher. Does that
make sense?
OFHCER WIHONGL Okay, it does. And you're saying
that the - we had talked earlier a little bit about
this.
PEAK ALARM: Un-huh.
OFHCER WIHONGL About the teacher and it was
Dianne - 1 dont know if you have your records in
front of you.
PEAK ALARM: I can bring it up right now. I have it
spelled out as a Dianne Hoyt
OFHCER WIHONGI: Okay. And she identified herself
as a teacher?
PEAK ALARM: As an employee.
OFHCER WIHONGL Okay. And she requested police;
is that coned?
PEAK ALARM: She requested police because some kids
had ran in the house, or ran in the building that were

23^
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OFFICER WIHOKGL ^ay. And you have that phone
call recorded, right
PEAK ALARM: We do, we do.
OFHCER WIHONGI: Okay.
PEAK ALARM: Including, from what I'm hearing
afterwards, she also called the police department
afterwards. That's what I'm hearing. I dont know if
she did or not, but I'm also hearing that after she
called us up to contact you guys that she actually
placed a phone call as welL
OFHCER WIHONGI: So have you listened to that
recorded message, the initial one coming into dispatch,
I mean your dispatch?
PEAK ALARM: No, I've not yet, but I'm actually
looking at i t I'm trying to find itrightnow.
OFHCER WIHONGI: Okay, because I had contacted that
Diane Hoyt there at the scene.
PEAK ALARM: Un-huh.
OFHCER WIHONGI: And she's a cafeteria worker, she
is an employee of the schooL
PEAK ALARM: Okay, so it's a cafeteria worker?
OFHCER WIHONGL We had talked a little bit about
why information wasnt given her - to her to call
dispatch. I believe our dispatch had told your
24
dispatch to have the complainant call directly to us.
PEAK ALARM: But we couldn't get a hold of her again
because we tried contacting that number back and we
couldn't get a hold of her so now we were like what do
we do now.
OFHCER WIHONGI: Okay.
PEAK ALARM: Does that make sense? Because dispatch
did tell us hey, have her call directly to us. But
then when we tried to contact her through the same
number we couldnt get a hold of her. So it's like
okay, what do we do now.
OFHCER WIHONGI: Was the infonnation given to her
originally to call the police?
PEAK ALARM: That was given her.
OFHCER WIHONGI: And this is where I'm a Utile
confused because I had sat down and I talked with her
and she said she didn't ask Peak Alarm, she didnt
request Peak Alarm to call the police. In fad, Peak
Alarm asked her, do you want us to call the police? I
asked her at any time did you give their dispatch any
indication that you were under stress or either
yourself was in imminent danger, or any members of your
staff, because she had a lot of people there working in
the cafeteria and she said no, I did not
PEAK ALARM: Okay. I will check on that recording
25
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and I could probably E-mail that ou
ou,that
recording so you can listen to it But thafs h o w - 1
haven't actually listened to that recording yet, but
thafs like I said, I read to you what was typed in the
computer that - usually when we have a situation like
that we do ask would you like police assistance. And
Pm assuming at that point they said yes, or - unless
we wouldn't have contacted you. Fin hoping. Now,
maybe my dispatcher screwed up again, I will look into

1 1
I 2
1 3
1 4
I 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
that and maybe get back with you on that But you
1 10
know, that does soundrightthat we asked her, would
I 11
1 12
you like police to respond and she said yes.
1 13
OFFICER WfflONGt Okay. And another question Jeff,
1 14
and like I said, I wasn't there.
1 15
PEAKALARM Yeah.
1 16
OFFICER WIHONGt 1 am going to do a report.
1 17
PEAK ALARM: Thafs fine.
18
OFFICER WIHONGt Because IVe got information from
19
dispatch. And I told you exactly why we were
20
dispatched. If s a triple B, that means it's a
21
priority one Something's happening right now so a lot
22
of officers, a lot of resources we used up at the scene
23
on that pretty big target this morning.
24
PEAK ALARM: Understandable.
25
26 1
report But I just want to get both sides of the story
verified, and when I put it in my report to the field

3 commander or my sergeant
4
PEAK ALARM: It will probably take me about 10
5 minutes to bring that other recording up and I will
6
listen to it and give you more information. If you
7 even want a copy of that recording,! don't know if you
8 have E-mail capability, I can actually E-mail these
9 recordings out
10
OFFICER WfflONGt If you - let's see, you're at
11 1534 South Gladiola?
12
PEAKALARM: Un-huh.
13
OFFICER WfflONGt What's the west on that or east?
14
PEAK ALARM: Ifs about 3400 West, I believe it is.
15
OFFICER WIHONGI: 3400 West
16
PEAK ALARM: Right off of California Avenue.
17
OFFICER WIHONGt Maybe M stop out there some
18 time today and just meet with you and give you my
19 business card
20
PEAK ALARM: No problem.
21
OFFICER WIHONGt Like I say, it came in as a
22 burglary alarm or it came in as a panic alarm or you
1

23

tell me what type of alarm it came in as,
PEAK ALARM: It originally came in as a burglary

25

alarm. We called there and at least, you know, Tm

124

L

going off the notes F. ading right now. We called
there and she answered the phone and thafs when we
asked if everything's okay with the burglar alarm. No,
some kids came in and are running around the place.
Well, you know, and then thafs when the dispatcher
probably asked what you said, which sounds right
Well, do you want police assistance? You know, because
when you have strangers you don't know running through
the place, that could be a potentially dangerous
situation. And so from what my gathering of the
dispatcher was is Pm assuming that Diane Hoyt said
yes, send them out Thafs why I have the comment you
know, she requested the police to respond And then at
that point the dispatcher contacted police dispatch.
Now, she made the problem of saying we have a burglary
alarm which then the dispatcher said we don't respond
to burglar alarms. Well then my dispatcher said no, we
have kids running around and we have teachers there,
and ifs an actual-you know, there's actual people
running around that shouldn't be there.
Well then the officers, and I actually - 1 actually
listened to this recording. Well then the police
dispatcher said well, have them contact us then before
we can send anyone out Well then we tried contacting
this Diane again which, you know, she didn't answer the

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
J
1
1
1
1
28

1 phone or whatever, so we're like okay, what do we do
2 now. And thafs when it was brought up to me and
3 thafs where I was worried. And okay, we have police
4 requesting or we have an employee of ihe school
5 requesting PD assistance. And the way my dispatcher
6 told it to me was that the police weren't going to
7 respond unless they actually called it ih.
8
I mean, it kind of made it sound like we weren't
9 good enough to be calling this in for them. Thafs
10 kind of the impression I got
11
OFFICER WIHONGt How was your dealings with the
12 dispatcher?
PEAK ALARM: It was actually professional. My
1 13
1 14 dealings were professional with them. And I didn't
1 15 have any problems with them. And see what I did, is
I 16 when I called back and I actually spoke with the same
J 17 person. And I said well, you know we actually have
1 18 someone there, but thafs when I said I thought it was
1 19 a guard that had visually verified it when it was
1 20 actually an emp!oyeer
I 21
1 22
1 23
J 24
1 25
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OFFICER WfflONGt When you had talked to me you madej
a statement, Jeff, that the dispatchers failed to send
J
or failed to respond on police services. And the
1
actual quote that you have used was whatever it took.
1
And you talked about a panic alarm.
I
29
1
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PEAK ALARM: Yes, and what 1
is to me a panic
I 2 alarm, this is our definition at Peak Alarm, is
1 3 someone's life could potentially be in danger. We know
14
we had an employee there, we know we had people that
1 5 were unauthorized to be there. That to me is a
1 6 potential danger for that employee of the Salt Lake
1 7 City School District
1 8
OFFICER WIHONGI: Okay. And that was your
I 9 interpretation. The dispatcher led you to believe that
110 someone was in immediate threat or danger?
1 11
PEAK ALARM: Yes, because they had unauthorized
1 12 people within the building that should not have been in
1 13 there. And that fits into our definition of what a
I 14 panic alarm is. Does that make sense?
1 15
OFFICER WIHONGI: I'll just tell you, to be honest,
116 that's not my understanding. I may be wrong and I
1 17 could go back to the station and check, and that's what
1 18 I told you earlier on today that that's not my
119 interpretation of what the (inaudible) on this.
1 20
PEAK ALARM: And maybe that's where we're having
1 21 problems is because our definition of a panic alarm is
1 22 riot that it necessarily is in danger, but someone's
1 23 life could potentially be in danger.
I 24
OFFICER WIHONGL Yeah. Talking to Diane there at
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touch base with them on this.
PEAK ALARM: Un-huk
OFFICER WIHONGL And as f ai as burglar alarms and
not having somebody respond to burglar alarms, thafs
one of the policies here at our department
PEAK ALARM: And we know that
OFFICER WIHONGI: And I'm kind of speaking to the
lady and the cafeteria workers there at the scene.
Yeah, it was her statement and then I have a written
statement that she didn't request police, she says it's
kind of our protocol if there's a couple of kids that
come walking in and we didn't know that we were going
to call the security, otherwise we would have called
police. And I asked her about/ did you give their
dispatcher any indication that you were in immediate
jeopardy, that you or yourself? And she said no, I
didn't I wasn't stressed, I just knew there were a
couple of kids that probably shouldn't have been on the
property and thafs why I called Peak Alarm, otherwise
I would have called police. Now, again, youVe got
that recorded?
PEAK ALARM: I'll be able to look it up and see what
happened. If that's the case my dispatcher really
screwed up and I need to - really, yeah.
OFFICER WIHONGI: Here we go John - Jeff, and 111
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be honest with you (ei*a of side one).
OFFICER WIHONGL - to me that your dispatcher did
a good job, but it sounds to me like you interpreted it
wrong. Does that make sense?
1
PEAK ALARM: No, because thafs how they told me.
I
Like I said, they said that - in fact they used the
I
word this lady is panicking. Thafs how it was told to
J
me, was that this lady was panicking and I heard it
1
from two dispatchers that were, one that sat next to
1
the other person. They both used the word panicking.
1
OFFICER WIHONGI: Okay. And like I say, there's a
lot have different people. I'm the initial officer on
I
this case.
1
PEAK ALARM: And thafs fine.
OFFICER WIHONGI: But I-there may have-that
1
information may have been relayed to you. There may
1
have been some problems with me as the officers. I
I
dont think so. The responding officers, we responded
1
on exactly what was dispatched. May be a problem with
I
Salt Lake dispatch or, and youVe pretty much said hey,
1
I assumed. And you used that little acronym there. So
1
what I'm going to d o 1
PEAK ALARM: Un*huh.
OFFICER WIHONGI: Like I said, Pve given you the
I
case number sir. I will go ahead and forward it on to
1
32
all our people and because there's, apparently there's
1
different definitions of different alarms and whatnot,
1
well have them make the decision. But this I do know
J
for sure.
1
PEAK ALARM: And let me say this. If we're even
J
charged for a false alarm, I don't care. I was just 1
hey, charge us if you have to, well be glad to pay it
1
I was just worried about this person being in danger.
1
Does that make sense?
1
OFFICER WIHONGL- Okay.
1
PEAK ALARM: I don't even mind paying a fine if I
1
have to.
1
OFFICER WIHONGL Well, I'm not - you know, I'm not J
the fine police or anything like that. I'm just1
when people make assumptions, we just go off whatever 1
the assumptions are. They could be good or they could
1
be bad, and a lot of times - sometimes it is good to
1
over assume something, but we need to make sure that
1
we're both professional organizations, 1 mean the
1
police department and Peak Alarm, and that we make sure 1
that we question our people because the officers
1
responding, they need up-to-date information, and they
I
need accurate information.
1
PEAK ALARM: Coned. Now, I hope the only thing
1
that I said that I assumed was who made the visual
1
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I 12
1
13
confirmation. I just assumed it was our guard rather
J 14
than an actual employee. So I just wanted to make that
1 15
distinction there.
1
16
OFHCER WfflONGfc Okay.
1
17
PEAK ALARM: Does that make sense? But I did know
18
that we did have visual confirmation that there was
1 19
unauthorized people in the building.
20
OFHCER WIHONGfc Okay. Do you have any questions
21
for me at all, Jeff?
22
PEAK ALARM. No, that sounds good.
23
OFHCER WfflONGfc Okay.
24
PEAKALARM: Hey,likelsay25
OFHCER WfflONGfc If Vm out there, and HI now
34
verification* And that wasOFFICER WIHONGfc But you did ten dispatch that
there was a guard on scene- Did you tell dispatch that
the guard saw the people or were chasing the people, or
he was requesting police or anything like that?
PEAK ALARM: We had visual confirmation, and there
are people in the building.
OFHCER WfflONGfc Yes, sir.
PEAK ALARM: But 1 assumed it was our guard that
made that visual confirmation, not an employee of Salt
Lake City School That was my mistake. And then

tell you this, I get real busy. If you could just have
i 1
2
that recording close and if I need to bring out a tape
3
I can do that But it may get so busy today that I may
4
not be able to get out there. If you could just hold
5
that if anyone from our alarm department, alarms
6
division contacts you, okay?
7
PEAK ALARM: Like Shanna or somebody?
8
OFHCER WIHONGfc Oh, you know Shanna?
9
PEAK ALARM Yep. I know her very well.
10
OFHCER WIHONGfc Shanna's the contact
11
PEAK ALARM In fact she'll probably be surprised
about this, but anyway.
I 12
1
OFHCER WIHONGfc Shanna * the contact person over J 13
here and1 14
PEAK ALARM Yep, I know her very welL So if she
I 15
needs to contact me or whatever and I know her E-mail
J 16
address so I might even just send this off to her.
1 17
OFHCER WIHONGfc You know what, I'm not even going 1 18
to come out Why don't you do that, why don't you just
119
send that straight to Shanna, that sounds like a better
1 20
problem.
1 21
PEAK ALARM: And 111 probably send her out all the
1 22
different recordings.
1 23
OFHCER WfflONGfc Un-huh.
1 24
PEAK ALARM And so she can listen (inaudible) know J 25

35_L

her.
1
OFHCER WIHONGfc ilie more information the better,
absolutely.
PEAK ALARM: Sounds good.
OFHCER WIHONGfc And you know what I said, just try
and get that definition with Shanna. Now, if Pm wrong
about that definition on what a panic alarm is, thenPEAKALARM: What is your interpretation of it?
OFHCER WfflONGfc My interpretation is someone needs
help ASAP. Thete's a weapon involved, someone is in
1
imminent jeopardy. The panic alarm is the same
(
priority as a robbery alarm at a bank going off.
1
PEAKALARM: A hold-up, okay.
OFHCER WIHONGfc Or a hold-up alarm, exactly. A
panic alarm and a hold-up alarm are the same thing.
1
And the reason why it's (Afferent than just a burglary
I
alarm because tactically the responding officers do it
1
a little different If that kind of makes sense and I
1
wont go too much into tactics.
J
PEAKALARM* That's
fine.
1
OFHCER WIHONGfc But a panic alarm is a (inaudible) 1
alarm, handled tadicaUy differently than a burglary
1
alarm is handled.
J
PEAKALARM: Let me ask you this then. What would
you call a situation where, lefs say you had a
1
36
resident call up from her house, a lady home alone and
1
she thinks she saw someone outside in her yard in the
1
bushes.
1
OFHCER WIHONGfc Thafs a prowler alarm, we
1
wouldn't handle it as a panic alarm. We would handle
1
it as a prowler and we would approach it tactically the
1
same as a burglar alarm. Does that make sense?
1
PEAK ALARM: And I think the alarm industry, I've
I
actually been in the alarm business 10, IS years, they
I
would view that as a panic, which is separate from a
1
hold-up. Does that make sense? And maybe that's where
J
a lot of the confusion is.
1
OFHCER WfflONGfc Someone is hiding in the bushes? I
PEAKALARM Because rather than making the phone 1
call into the police department, lefs say they just
1
hit a panic button, cuz that's what happens.
1
OFHCER WfflONGfc Now if they hit a panic button, no
one can decipher exactly what that is, do you
1
understand me? Because there's no contact over the
phone. Then officers will respond on a panic alarm.
1
Thafs different tactically than just a prowler in the
1
area.
1
PEAK ALARM: Okay, that makes sense. I can
1
understand your interpretation as well and that
1
actually helps me a lot Okay. Well, let's do that
J
37]
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And like I say 111 just go ahead
send those.
OFFICER WIHONGL' Just - you know what Fm not
even going to come out there at alL To be honest with
you, we've been real busy today and that would help out
a lot more if you just sent thatrightto Shanna, as
much information that you can. Ill have in my report
the information on the lady down there at the scene and
her written statement
PEAK ALARM: Okay.
OFFICER WIHONGt And then dispatch, IVe called
11 back over there and those folks are going to do a
12 little report and well send it over there just to make
13 sure everybody's on the, you know, therightpath.
PEAK ALARM: Yeah, and I dont want to waste any
14
more
of your of your time.
15
OFFICER
WIHONGI: Sounds good, thank you.
16
PEAK ALARM: Thank you so much. Take care.
17
OFFICER WIHONGt Un-huh.
18
PEAK ALARM: Bye.
19
20 (End of tape)
21
22
23
24
25
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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11
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23
24
25

MS.HOYT:A
>t
PEAK ALARM: AMghty.
MS.HOttiOkay,bye.
Pause
UNIDENTIFIED: Hello?
PEAK ALARM: Yeah, this is Brook with Peak Alarm.
Is Bill in?
UNIDENTIFIED: No, he's not
PEAK ALARM: Okay, thank you.
UNIDENTIFIED: Un-huh.
(Call made, ringing).
MACHINE: Your call has been forward to an automatic
voice message system. Phil Bradly is not available.
At the tone please record your message.
(End of recording.)
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CD ROM CALL FROM HOYT
PEAK ALARM: Hi this is Brook, can I help you?
MS. HOYT: Hi We just had two people walk in and
walk upstairs and set the alarm off.
PEAK ALARM: Okay, what's your name?
MS. HOYT: Ifs Dianne Hoyt
PEAK ALARM: Okay, so everything is. okay?
MS. HOYT: Yeah.
PEAK ALARM: Okay.
MS. HOYT: But I have no idea who the kids were that
came in.
PEAK ALARM: Oh really, they just walked in there
and started setting it off, huh?
MS. HOYT: Yeah.
PEAK ALARM: Are they still in there or did they
leave?
MS. HOYT: They are still in here I guess. They
went upstairs, upstairs.
PEAK ALARM: Yeah, we're getting it on the second
floor, on the north media stairs.
MS. HOYT: So we dont even know who they are.
PEAK ALARM: Okay. Do you want me to dispatch
police or what do you want me to do.
MS. HOYT: You know, I would, just to get them.
PEAK ALARM: Okay.
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Tab 4

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE)

I

5399 - 1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM

General Offense Information
Operational status INACTIVE
Reported on Jun-27-2003 (Fri) 1040
Occurred on Jun-27-2003 (FrL) 0857
Approved on JuJ-14-2003 (Mon.) by F45 - Bryant, James F (Retired)
Report submitted by J17 - Wihongi, Shaun
Org unit Pioneer Patrol/B/Day
Accompanied by K17 - Hanks, Kristopher
Located at 241 N 300 W
Municipality Salt Lake City Proper County CncI Dist 3
District 1 Beat 111 Grid CAH

Offenses (Completed/Attempted)
Offense #1 5399 -1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM - COMPLETED
Location School/College
Suspect used Not Applicable
Offense #2 2299 -98 BURG ALARM-CAUSE UNKN - COMPLETED
Location School/College
Suspect used Not Applicable

General Offense Information (cont'd)
Bias None (no bias)
Gang involvement None/Unknown
Family violence NO
LBR Clearance status Not Applicable

Related Event(s)
CF
AB

SL2003-108471
SL2003-11018

COMPLAINT INFORMATION

Incident Location
Address 241 N 300 W
District 1 Beat 111 Grid CAH

General Information

I
i

Case type BURGLARY IN PROGRESS Priority 1
TIME-Disp 08:59:47 Enroute 09:00:08 At Scene 09:01:58 Clrd 10:40:00
How call received TELEPHONE

J
I

Complainant Information
Name PEAK ALARM JEFF
Home Telephone 801486-7231
Remarks
PER PEAK. JPER PEAK GUARD„JdAVE 2-3 KIDS^.2ND
FLOOR..BURG ALARM DROPPED AT 846 HRS.„ STSG IN
FRONT..IN UNIFORM
A120/32 COPIES
For WS0627 Friday May 6,2005
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SALT LAKE P O L I C E D E P A R T M E N T
G O SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE)

i

5399 - 1 PUB P E A C E - F A L S E FERE A L A R M

D582 ENR ALSO..JHLAS A SET OF KEYS
MOTORS ARRIVED IN THE REAR
A468 HOLDING NAY CORNER
A459 #4 CORNER
N/SIDE DOORS... 2 TEENAGE GIRLS WENT INSIDE
N/SIDE OF THE BUILDING ... SEND GUARD THERE WHEN THEY FIND
HIM
PER PEAK ALARM/ THERE IS NO PEAK GUARD ON SCENE/ IT WAS
ACTUALLY THE TEACHERS WHO CALLED PEAK ALARM.
F JUV WALKING IN FRONT DOOR/ AI23 WITH HER

Clearance Information
Final Case type • BURGLAR ALARM - CAUSE UNKNOWN
Report expected NO Founded YES
Cleared by . INVESTIGATION CONTINUING
Reporting Officer! J17 - Wihongi, Sharm

Related Person(s)
Case Specific : Arrestee - 01 HOWE, MICHAEL JEFFREY
Caucasian/White MALE
Bora on Nov~19-1975
Residing at 3240 E SEVEN SPRINGS DR, SANDY , Utah 84092Occupation SUPERVISOR
Employed by PEAK ALARM CO. 1534 S. GLADIOLA SLC, UT
Reference Master Name Index
HOWE, MICHAEL JEFFREY
Unknown MALE
Bora on Nov-19-1975
Aliases
HOWE, JEFF
Linkage factors
Resident status Non-Resident
Offense 5399 - 1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM - COMPLETED
Arrest date Jnl-21-2003 (MOIL)
Arrest type Misd Citation Issued
Summons:
M15389771MDMD76 9 105
False fire alarm
Disposition
Case Specific : Witness - 01 HOYT, DIANNE
Caucasian/White FEMALE
Residing at 6358 W 4100 S , WEST VALLEY , Utah
For WS0627 Friday May 6, 2005
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SAL r LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE)
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5399 - 1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM

Phone Numbers
Home (801)969-5410
Occupation SUPERVISOR
Employed by WEST HIGH CAFETERIA
Reference Master Name Index
HOYT, D1ANNE
Caucasian/White FEMALE
Born on Feb-13-1960
Linkage factors
Resident status Non-Resident
Statement taken YES

Related text page(s)
Document
Author

SGT NARRATIVE
F4 5 - Bryant, James F (Retired)
Subject Jeff Howe
Related date/time Jul-21-2003 1540
I reviewed this case on 14 July 2003 as part of my supervisory
responsibilities
I noted that AP Jeff Howe had provided false information to SLCPD dispatch
m order to get a police response to West High
The false information
provided was that an employee or agent of Peak Alarm was on the scene, and
that the employee or agent either had contact with or knowledge of
unauthorized persons on the premises
Howe later stated to Officer Wihongi that he was dissatisfied with SLCPD's
lack of response when Peak called m a burglar alarm
He furtner stated
"Whatever it takes, I thought this was a panic alarm"
I subsequently reviewed this information with Associate City Prosecutor
Holly Barrmgham
This was not a formal screening, but she felt that the
information I gave her met the elements of Utah code 76-9-105
She also
said that either a formal screening or the issuance of a misdemeanor
citation would be appropriate
On 21 July 2003, Officer S Hunt and I met with AP Howe at Peak Alarm and
issued misdemeanor citation # 15389771

For WS0627 Friday May 6,2005

Page 3

of 7

1723

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE)

5399 - 1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM

Related text page(s)
Document: INITIAL R/O
Author: J17 - Wihongi, Shaun
Related date/time: Jun-27-2003 1043
WE RESPONDED TO WEST HIGH SCHOOL ON THE REPORT OF A BURGLARY IN PROGRESS.
COMP, JEFF HOWE WITH PEAK ALARM STATED TO DISPATCH THAT A PEAK ALARM
SECURITY GUARD WAS REQUESTING POLICE AT THE HIGH SCHOOL AND THAT THE GUARD
HAD 2-3 KIDS ON THE 2ND LEVEL OF THE SCHOOL. 7 OFFICERS RESPONDED TO THE
SCROOL. 4 PIONEER PATROL UNITS, 2 MOTOR UNITS AND THE HIGH SCHOOL RESOURCE
DETECTIVE. DISPATCH STATED THAT THE PEAK ALARM OFFICER WOULD BE ON SCENE TO
DIRECT. AS UNITS ARRIVED THEY WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE SECURITY. I REQUESTED
THAT DISPATCH CONTACT PEAK ALARM AND HAVE THEM GET A LOCATION ON THERE
OFFICER. DISPATCH STATED THAT PEAK ALARM WAS NOW STATING THAT A SECURITY
OFFICER HAD NOT BEEN DISPATCHED TO THAT LOCATION AND THEY WOULD NOT BE
SENDING ANYONE TO THE SCENE. WE CHECKED THE BUILDING AND FOUND THE SCHOOL
SECURE. I CALLED COMP, JEFF HOWE (PEAK ALARM SUPERVISOR) AND ASKED HIM WHY
SLCPD HAD BEEN GIVEN THE WRONG INFORMATION AND WHO THE ACTUAL COMP WAS. HE
STATED THAT "SCHOOL TEACHER", DIANNE HOYT HAD CALLED PEAK ALARM DISPATCH
STATING THAT 2 KIDS HAD WALKED INTO THE BUILDING AND THEY NEEDED
SECURITY. JEFF STATED THAT DIANNE REQUESTED POLICE AND ASKED IF PEAK ALARM
COULD SUMMON SLCPD. SLCPD DISPATCH ADVISED PEAK ALARM DISPATCHERS THAT WE
DID NOT RESPOND ON BURGLARY ALARMS.AND THAT ON-SCENE VICTIMS MUST NOTIFY
POLICE JEFF CALLED SLCPD DISPATCH AND REQUESTED POLICE TO THE SCENE AGAIN
AND HE WAS THE COMP, REPORTING THAT HIS SECURITY OFFICER WAS ON-SCENE
REQUESTING POLICE WHEN THAT IN FACT DID NOT OCCUR. WHEN I ASKED JEFF HOW HE
RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION , HE STATED THAT HE WAS "LEAD TO BELIEVE" BY HIS
DISPATCHER THAT PEOPLE (EMPLOYEES OF THE SALT LAKE SCHOOL DISTRICT) WERE IN
IMMINENT DANGER AND HE WAS NOT HAPPY WITH SLCPD FOR NOT SENDING ANYONE TO
THE SCENE. JEFF ADMITTED TO ME THAT HE HAD MADE ASSUMPTIONS . WHEN I ASKED
HIM WHY HE MADE THE STATEMENTS TO DISPATCH HE STATED "WHATEVER IT TAKES , I
THOUGHT THIS WAS A PANIC ALARM" . I EXPLAINED TO JEFF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
A BURGLARY ALARM AND A PANIC ALARM AND HOW OFFICERS RESPOND DIFFERENTLY. I
CONTACTED THE INITIAL COMP, DIANNE HOYT (SCHOOL LUNCH ROOM SUPERVISOR) WHO
STATED THAT SHE DID CALL PEAK ALARM AND THAT IT WAS PEAK ALARM THAT
SUGGESTED POLICE BE CALLED NOT HER. SHE ALSO STATED THAT AT NO TIME DID HER
OR HER STAFF WHO WERE ON SCENE FELL THAT THEY WERE IN EMINENT DANGER. I
TALKED WITH JEFF AGAIN ON THE PHONE AND HE APOLOGISED FOR THE
MISCOMMUNICATION STATING THAT HE WOULD SPEAK WITH HIS DISPATCH. HE TOLD ME
THAT IT WOULD BE FINE IF PEAK ALARM WAS FINED. NFD

For. WS0627 Friday May 6, 2005
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GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE)
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5399 - 1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FERE ALARM

Related text pagefs)
Document OTHER F/U
Author 15H - Werner, Shanna
Related date/time
Jul-22-2003
July 14, 2003
I returned from a three week absence to receive a phone call from Sgt Jim
Bryant and an office visit from Communications Supervisor Diane Powell
advising me of an incident of emergency services abuse at West High School
I due to false information given to police communications by Jeff Howe, the
Central Station Manager of Peak Alarm
I read police case 03-108471 and the initial officer's report by Officer
Wihongi
During my absence I had received an email from Jeff Howe with
audio clips of phone conversations between Diane Hoyt, lunchroom worker for
West High School and the Peak Alarm Dispatcher
I listened to this audio
clip several times
Jeff had requested a return phone call from me
After
listening to the rationalization of his actions with Officer Wihongi, I
felt a phone call to him would result m more of the rationalization and
justification of which I had already heard
The mistruth by Jeff Howe on
the tape provided by dispatch was very evident and I felt listening to more
rhetoric was unnecessary. I had experienced a similar untruth from Jeff
Howe regarding an alarm at Cahoots (a business) several years ago
Jeff
had called me and tried to get an officer to respond on a burglar alarm
signal, claiming the burglar was m the business and had answered the
telephone
No officer was dispatched and Jeff was advised to send one of
Peak's guards
The man turned out to be the owner of the business
Sgt
Jim Bryant advised me that it was unnecessary to warn Jeff Howe nor Peak
Alarm of the pending citation
July 15, 2003 - I spoke with Chuck Smith (phone 578-8361), Salt Lake City
School District regarding case 03-108471
He stated that their contract
with Peak Alarm only includes monitoring, not guard response
Unknown why
Jeff Howe would promise a Peak guard response to police communications,
when correct protocol would have been to contact Chuck Smith or a
responsible party at Salt Lake City School District West High received a
false alarm fine m conjunction with this case for a false alarm where no
emergency occurred
July 21, 2003 - Sgt Jim Bryant cited Jeff Howe with a Class B Misdemeanor,
Utah Code Section 76-9-105 - Making a false alarm
II 00 - I received a call from the Salt Lake City Recorder
She had an
anonymous caller asking for a copy of the city code on false alarm
information
I informed her it was probably Peak Alarm calling and it was
a state code, not a city code and faxed her a copy
1400 hours - Jeff Howe called asking for Chief D m s e ' s phone number
1410 - I met with Assistant Chief Scott Folsom, Chief D m s e , and Lt
Burbank
summarizing the West High School situation
15 00 - Jerry Howe, owner of Peak Alarm and father of Jeff Howe called
asking why I had not replied to Jeff's email requesting I call him
I
explained to him that the mistruth by Jeff Howe on the tape provided by
dispatch was very evident and I felt more rhetoric was unnecessary
He
For WS0627 Fnday May 6,2005
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5399 -1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM

1 s t a t e d t h a t he and h i s a t t o r n e y want c o p i e s of t h e p o l i c e
I r e f e r r e d him t o Lt Bur/bank
I tape
15 30 -- I c o n t a c t e d Sgt
call

James Bryant ,

communications

a d v i s i n g him of J e r r y Howe ' s

phone

Related text page(s)
Document: ASSTG FIELD STOP
Author: J17 - Wihongi, Shaun
Related date/time.- Jun-27-2003 1508
PLEASE NOTE THAT PEAK ALARM WAS RECEIVING ALARM DROPS (INTERIOR MOTION) FROM
THE BUILDING DURING THE TIME OF THE DISPATCHED INCIDENT AND AUDIBLE ALARMS
HAD BEEN ACTIVATED IN THE BUILDING DIANE WHO WAS ON SCENE WITH HER STAFF
DID NOT SEE THE 2 FEMALE JUVENILES ENTER BUT WAS TOLD THAT INFORMATION BY
ONE OF HER STAFF.

Related Property Report
Report Information
Report Number 03108471
Property case status PERSONAL/SAFEKEEPING
Submitted on Jul-28-2003 (Mori.) by Werner, Shanna
Offense GO SL 2003-108471
Insurance letter received NO
Related items 1
Article - Evidence
item #:
Status. PERS/SAF
Article.
AUDIO DISK
MakeMAXELL VR
Model #•
Ser. #:
03108471
Value*
Description:
TWO MAXELL UR AUDIO TAPES
Recovered Date:
Recovered Location
Flags: *e

Tag#

03108471-1

# of Pieces.
OAN
Color
Recovered Value:

Arrest Information
Status CHARGED
Type of arrest Misd Citation issued
For WS0627 Fnday May 6,2005
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GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE)

5399 -1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FERE ALARM

Reason for arrest Other
Arrest date Jtm-27-2003 (Fn.) 0900
Arrest agency S.JLC.PD
Arresting officers F45 - Bryant, James F (Retired)
Summary of facts
M O MAKING FALSE ALARM
Arrest Location
Civic address 315 E 200 S
Municipality Salt Lake City Proper County Cnci Dist 4
District 2 Beat 212 Grid CEC
Arrest Identification
Arrest number 11018
Arrestee Information
Case screened NO Notify Victim on release NO Juvenile NO
Diversion recommended NO
Interpreter needed NO
Rights given NO
Mental exam required NO
S tatement taken N O
Fingerprinted NO Photo taken NO CD updated YES
Family notified NO
Lawyer called NO Meal given NO Coffee given NO Detained NO
Arrestee's occupation SUPERVISOR
Related General Offense
GOSL 2003-108471

Related Arrestee
Arrestee
HOWE, MICHAEL JEFFREY
Born on Nov-19-1975
** END OF HARDCOPY **
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S T E P H E N G. CLARK, L.c.
1 3 11
SALT

EAST 4 Q D

LAKE

CITY,

PH. (BD1 )
FAX ( B D 1 )

SOUTH

UTAH

B4

5B2-6995
5BZ-65D4

1D2

RECEIVED
JUN 2 5 200*

June 25,2004

CITY RECORDER

VIA HAND DELIVERY
Kendrick Cowley, Recorder
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
451 South State Street, Room 415
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Notice of Claim Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11(2):
Peak Alarm, Jerry D. Howe and Michael Jeffrey Howe v. Salt Lake City
Corporation, Shanna Werner, RicDinse, James Bryant and Dwayne Baird

Dear Salt Lake City Recorder:
I have been retained to represent Peak Alarm, Jerry D. Howe and Michael Jeffrey Howe
in connection with a claim of unlawful conduct by Salt Lake City Corporation and one or more
of its officers, agents, representatives or employees. This letter is a Notice of Claim pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11(2).
Statement of Facts:
Peak Alarm is a family-owned Salt Lake company. Its more than 250 employees provide
private security services throughout the State of Utah, working as an adjunct to public safety
officials. Peak Alarm was founded in 1969 by Jerry Howe. Jerry has over 40 years of
experience in the industry. His goal in founding Peak Alarm was to establish a company that
would pjovide the highest quality of professionalism and service. Peak Alarm has been in
business for 35 years, has established an excellent reputation, now passing to a new generation
including Jerry's sons, for providing reliable, professional security services.
Peak Alamo has always pursued a strong working relationship with law enforcement
based on cooperation and mutual respect. As detailed below, however, Salt Lake City, its Police
Department and particularly its Alarm Administrator, Sharuia Werner, have sought to tarnish that
reputation and destroy that relationship through increasingly aggressive, unwarranted and
ultimately unlawful and unconstitutional conduct.

Peak Alarm and others in the alarm industry in Utah and nationwide provide valuable
services, including alarm installation and on-site and remote monitoring. Alarms occasionally go
off by mistake or under other circumstances not involving a genuine emergency. Peak Alarm
and others in the industry have worked hard to reduce the number of such "false alarms," and
have developed and identified a number of sensible measures that can benefit both public and
private entities and employees charged with ensuring the public safety. At the same time, Peak
Alarm and others have opposed measures that impose burdensome or unworkable requirements
on public and private entities and employees and unreasonable risks on the public, without a
corresponding public benefit. One such measure is the "no-response" ordinance.
"No-response" ordinances typically prevent law enforcement from responding to a
private alarm unless the alarm is visually corroborated or otherwise "verified" in some fashion.
The alarm industry's general position is that "no-response" ordinances are at best ineffective and
can even derogate from important community efforts to increase public safety by increasing the
risk that genuine emergencies will not be addressed in a timely fashion.
Michael Jeffrey Howe, known as Jeff Howe, is Jerry Howe's son and Peak Alarm's
Central Station Manager. His responsibilities as Central Station Manager include managing
proper dispatch in response to alarm signals and reducing the number of false alarms. His
position requires that he be licensed by the State. His license can be revoked if he is convicted of
a crime.
Besides his responsibilities as Peak Alarm's Central Station Manager, he has also served
since early 2003 as Chairman of the No-Response Committee for the Utah Alarm Association,
an industry association that seeks to maximize the public benefit that can be obtained from
strong communication and coordination between public safety and private security entities and
employees. The No-Response Committee was formed in 2001 to articulate and advocate the
alarm industry's position on the important public safety issues that arise when municipalities
consider adopting "no-response" ordinances. Those issues are multifarious but center on
whether the public interest is well-served by "no-response" ordinances or whether other means
of insuring proper coordination between public safety officials and private security concerns
better serve the public interest.
In his capacity as Chairman of the No-Response Committee, Jeff has been a highly
visible, articulate and effective spokesperson for the alarm industry's position on those important
issues. Jeff appeared, publicly identified himself as a representative of Peak Alarm and the
alarm industry, and spoke at a meeting of the Murray City Municipal Council on June 10, 2003,
at which the subject of "no-response" ordinances was discussed. Jeff expressed the alarm
industry's, Peak Alarm's and his own views in opposition to "no-response" ordinances.
Salt Lake City, acting principally through Shanna Werner, the Alarm Administrator for
the City, has developed, has adopted and publicly advocates a position on "no-response"
ordinances that differs from that of the alarm industry. Salt Lake City itself adopted such an
ordinance in 2002, and both individually and in her official capacity Ms. Werner has urged that
other communities in Utah and across the country adopt "no-response" ordinances. Ms. Werner,
Sgt. James Bryant and other representatives of Salt Lake City also appeared and spoke at the

above meeting of the Murray City Municipal Council, expressing their views in support of "noresponse" ordinances.
To the extent Salt Lake City and Ms. Wenier have advocated their position vigorously
tlirough proper channels and with reference to facts, they have been within their rights to express
a viewpoint on an important public policy subject. Mr. Howe and other industry spokespersons
have similarly been within their rights to advocate their differing viewpoint on the same subject.
Peak Alarm and Mr. Howe are committed to the public process and are confident that when the
facts are presented and vigorous but fair advocacy airs competing viewpoints, the public interest
is served. Salt Lake City and its officers, agents and employees, and particularly Ms. Werner,
have gone well beyond what is legally and constitutionally appropriate.
Rather than present the City's and her own point of view in support of "no-response"
ordinances in public hearings and with the facts, Ms. Wenier, acting at the behest and with the
support of the police department, has mounted a wideranging and public campaign that features
exaggerated, misleading and/or false statements against the alarm industry itself and individuals
within the industry. For example, in media interviews, Ms. Wenier has sought to paint the entire
alarm industry with a broad and damaging brush by relating isolated anecdotes involving the
alleged practices of a few companies:
H In comments published by KSL on or about April 22, 1999, Ms. Werner
characterized the entire alarm industry as "preying on [the] fears" of senior citizens,
"selling them this alarm system as the panacea for all ills."
•

In a letter to the editor published in the Salt Lake Tribune on or about March 15,
2000, Ms. Wenier criticized a paid ad by the Utah Alann Association as using
"tactics typical of this industry to scare, bully, threaten."

H In comments published by the Wall Street Journal on or about April 28, 2000, Ms.
Wenier cited alleged incidents where an alarm company sold an alann to an elderly
blind woman who frequently set off the "panic" button when she meant to turn on
her system, and incurred heavy fines; a salesman told a homeowner his young
daughters could "disappear" if he didn't buy a security system; and a company
continued to charge monitoring fees to a homeowner after he had sold his house,
and then charged the same fees to the buyer, too. Ms. Warner concluded: "As far as
I'm concerned, this whole alann business is a scam."
H In a letter that appeared in the June 2002 issue of Security Sales magazine, Ms.
Werner staled: "It is so common within the alarm industry for emotion to lake
control and a 'smoke-aiid-min'ors' approach to be used in an attempt to cloud the
issue."
•

In an October 2, 2002 email published to various third parties, Ms. Wenier alleged
that an industry spokesperson had "grossly misrepresented the burglary statistics for
Salt Lake City Police Department" and threatened that publication of the
spokesperson's presentation "will result in litigation." Ms. Wenier subsequently

sent emails to third persons throughout the United States warning them "to be
cautious in spreading the false statistics." In fact, the presentation referred to,
entitled "Effective Alarm Management/' was based on statistics obtained directly
from the Salt Lake City Police Department website.
•

In comments published by a Savannah newspaper on or about December 22, 2002,
Ms. Werner contended: "They [the alarm industry] like to have free emergency
response, with no responsibility but to rake in that monthly monitoring fee."

•

In comments published in an industry newsletter in July 2003, Ms. Werner is quoted
as stating: "This is an industry that is in complete denial about the reality of false
alarms."

•

In a letter dated April 30, 2003, on Salt Lake City Corporation Police Department
letterhead, addressed to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, Ms. Werner alleged
that the alarm industry was attempting to engage in a "conspiracy" with an
insurance company involving "a plot to penalize their customers and other citizens"
for their own "political and economic gains." Ms. Werner went on to allege that the
conspirators sought "to defraud their customers in an attempt to force police to
resume responding to an alarm signal that was 99.7% false."

Ms. Werner has also targeted Peak Alarm specifically. By letter dated March 21, 2002,
on Salt Lake City Corporation Police Department letterhead, Ms. Werner addressed a Peak
Alarm customer, encouraging it to "consider selecting another company who will do a better job
for you."
The purpose and effect of this campaign has been to unfairly and seriously malign Peak
Alarm and the entire alarm industry and, as a result, to threaten the existing contracts and future
business prospects of Peak Alarm and others in the industry, and to send a chill over the
expression of legitimate viewpoints on an important matter of public interest.
Ms. Werner, Sgt. Bryant and others acting in their individual and official capacities on
behalf of Salt Lake City have taken even more aggressive action in their campaign, crossing the
line from vigorous advocacy and misleading statements to more patently illegal and
unconstitutional actions. Specifically, having determined to find a case to charge and prosecute
as a "false alarm" in furtherance of their anti-security industry campaign, they targeted Jeff
Howe and Peak Alarm. On July 25, 2003, just weeks after Jeff Howe's public presentation at the
Murray City Council meeting, Salt Lake City filed a criminal information against Jeff Howe,
alleging he had committed the criminal offense of violating the Utah State Code, Section 76-9105(1), by making a false alarm - a crime punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of up
to $1000 plus an 85% surcharge. This charge not only threatened Jeffs licensure and ability to
pursue his livelihood, but also was intended to send and did send a broader, chilling message.
The charge arose out of the following incident, as set forth in Findings of Fact entered by
Judge Paul Iwasaki of the Salt Lake City Justice Court on May 4, 2004. Peak has a contract with
the Salt Lake City School District pursuant to which Peak provides certain security services for

District schools, including West High School. These services include the use of remote motion
sensoring alarms. On June 27, 2003, when school was not in session and no unauthorized
individuals were permitted on the premises, certain of the motion sensoring alarms were
activated at West High. Shortly thereafter, Diane Hoyt, an employee of the District, contacted
Peak concerning the alarms, which could be heard on the dispatch recording. She informed
Peak's dispatcher that there were two individuals in the school who had activated the alarms and
they were not authorized to be on the premises. She did not know who the persons were or what
their intentions were. When Peak's dispatcher asked if Ms. Hoyt wanted her to dispatch the Salt
Lake City police, Ms. Hoyt answered in the affirmative.
Peak's dispatcher contacted Salt Lake City Police Dispatch and informed it of the call
from West High. The police dispatcher said Salt Lake Police would not respond to the call, even
though there had been visual confirmation of the two individuals, unless the client itself made the
call to Salt Lake City Police Dispatch.
Shortly thereafter during the morning of June 27, 2003, Jeff Howe contacted Salt Lake
City Police Dispatch requesting that the Salt Lake City Police respond to the alarm at West High,
and informing police dispatch they had been unable to reestablish contact with the client.
Shortly thereafter, several Salt Lake City Police officers arrived at West High and
attempted to intercede with what may have been a burglary in progress. However, the two
individuals reportedly inside West High had apparently exited the building by the time the police
arrived. At least, the police were unable to locate them. However, the Salt Lake City police
officer in charge of the investigation spoke with Ms. Hoyt who again confirmed that two
unauthorized individuals had entered the premises and set off the alarms.
Summarizing the incident, Judge Iwasaki found as follows upon trial of the false alarm
charge:
The witnesses and evidence presented by the City established that there was an
alarm at West High School, there were two unauthorized individuals on the
premises of West High School which caused the alarm, and that no one knew
what was the intent of the individuals, including whether they intended to cause a
theft or commit a felony while in the West High School premises, and that Mrs.
Hoyt had asked for police assistance in removing the individuals from the
premises. The evidence presented above was undisputed.
None of the evidence presented by the City established Mr. Howe's intent at the
time he contacted Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor was there any evidence
presented by the City to establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally made
false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch.
Based on the foregoing facts, Judge Iwasaki concluded:
1.

The City has failed to produce any evidence establishing criminal intent.

2.

The City has not met the necessary elements to prove Mr. Howe violated Utah
Code Ann. §76-9-105(1).

3.

There has been no evidence presented that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally
made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false alarm as
defined by Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1).

4.

Accordingly, the defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict is hereby granted.

Ms. Werner and others acting in coordination with her or at her behest and on behalf of
Salt Lake City were unconcerned with and unconstrained by the facts or the law in bringing and
pursuing this charge. Ms. Werner reported that she had returned from a three-week absence to
receive a phone call from Sgt. Bryant and an office visit from Communications Supervisor Diane
Powell advising her of the above incident. Ms. Werner immediately characterized the incident as
one involving "emergency services abuse at West High School due to false information given to
police communications by Jeff Howe, the Central Station Manager of Peak Alarm." She also
reported that Jeff Howe had sent her an email about the incident with audio clips of the relevant
conversations and had requested a return call. She declined, however, to contact Mr. Howe or
otherwise to further investigate the incident: "After listening to the rationalization of his actions
with Officer Wihongi [one of the Salt Lake City police officers who responded to the incident], I
felt a phone call to him would result in more of the rationalization and justification of what I had
already heard. The mistruth [sic] by Jeff Howe on the tape provided by dispatch was very
evident and I felt listening to more rhetoric was unnecessary."
At Ms. Werner's and Sgt. Bryant's urging, the full power of the Salt Lake Police
Department and the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office was brought to bear against Jeff Howe.
In a virtually unprecedented display, not only was a citation issued, but Sgt Bryant himself, along
with another Salt Lake City Police officer, personally served the citation on Jeff Howe at Peak
Alarm. Ms. Werner viewed the charge and the subsequent prosecution as a way to send a
message to the broader industry that she had long targeted and tarred with broad-brush, unfair
and slanderous comments. She was able to convince both the Police Department and the City
Prosecutor's Office to vigorously pursue the case, not for the puipose of enforcing the criminal
laws, but for the purpose of seeking to punish Mr. Howe for doing his job and exercising his
constitutional rights. The Security System News reported that while she declined to discuss the
specifics of the case, she "hoped Howe would be found guilty": "'I'm hoping for the
enforcement of our ordinance [under which Jeff Howe was not even charged] that it goes well,'
she said. 'If the jury lets Peak Alarm off the hook, to me that's a signal to other alarm companies
to call Salt Lake City police and tell them whatever they want.'"
Nature of the Claim:
The above-described conduct gives rise to several claims and causes of action against
Salt Lake City and its officers, agents or employees, collectively referred to below as Salt Lake
City. Those claims and causes of action arise under both federal and state statutes and the
common law, and include:

•

False arrest and/or false imprisonment, in that Salt Lake City caused Jeff Howe to be
arrested when no reasonable and prudent person acting in good faith would be
justified in believing facts existed that would warrant the making of an arrest.

•

Malicious prosecution, in that Salt Lake City caused a criminal proceeding to be
initiated and continued against Jeff Howe, the proceeding was terminated in his favor,
there was no probable cause for the proceeding, and the primary purpose was other
than that of bringing the alleged offender to justice.

•

Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
and similar rights under the Utah Constitution, in that Salt Lake City intended to and
did inhibit and punish the free exercise of rights granted under the United States and
Utah Constitutions, causing damage to Jeff Howe, Peak Alarm and others by seeking
to restrain them from expressing and advocating their viewpoint on the subject of
"no-response" ordinances while Salt Lake City remained free to express and advocate
its own competing viewpoint on the same subject, and by punishing them for
expressing their viewpoint.

•

Violation of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, in that Salt Lake City
initiated and continued an action relating or in response to an act of Jeff Howe while
participating in the process of government, without a substantial basis in fact or law,
and for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously
inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted under the United States and Utah
Constitutions, causing damage to Jeff Howe.

•

Tortious interference with existing and prospective employment and business
relations, in that Salt Lake City knew of Jeff Howe's employment and Peak Alarm's
existing and prospective business relations and intentionally or negligently interfered
with those relations for improper purposes or through improper means, causing
damage to Peak Alarm and to Jeff Howe.

Out-of-Pocket Damages:
Presently calculated:
Legal Fees and Costs
Incurred in Defense of

$24,261.00 fees
$ 1,452.72 costs

Criminal Proceeding

$25,713.72 total

Lost wages:

$ 7,500.00

TOTAL
$33,213.72
In addition to out-of-pocket damages, Peak Alarm, Jerry Howe and Jeff Howe seek all
other damages allowed by law in an amount currently unknown but believed to be not less than

$100,000.00, plus punitive damages as may be appropriate based on the nature of the conduct
alleged. They may also seek declaratory and injunctive relief as may be appropriate.
In addition to the foregoing claims, Peak, as a taxpayer in Salt Lake City, is concerned
about Ms. Werner's activities as a taxpayer-supported lobbyist against the alann industry, and
about whether taxpayers are even receiving the value of the services she purports to provide in
that capacity. Ms. Werner travels extensively in the conduct of the above-described campaign.
For example, she sought and received permission to travel, at taxpayer expense, to the 7th Annual
International Training Conference of FARA (the False Alarm Reduction Association) in New
Orleans from April 14-18, 2003. Ms. Werner justified the public expense by stating: "The
classes and networking I receive at this conference have proven to be invaluable in formulating
our alann program. I am on the board of directors and will be a participant on a panel discussion
on verified response." According to a special announcement issued by FARA, however, the
FARA Board met at the end of the conference and unanimously approved the following motion:
'To remove Shanna Werner as Secretary of FARA and Chairperson of the Quality Commitment
Committee for neglect of duty in office." The motion resulted from "concern over the fact that
Secretary Werner had missed a majority of the sessions held during the conference, including the
Friday Board Meeting, without notifying anyone of a reason or need to miss the meetings."
Peak requests that this and other similar incidents be investigated and addressed
appropriately and that Peak and the public be provided with the results of the investigation.

Attorney for Peak Alann
Jerry D. Howe and
Michael Jeffrey Howe
SCC
cc:

Ed Rutan, Salt Lake Cily Attorney
Jeiry D. Howe
Jeff Howe
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PEAK ALARM COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation; JERRY D. HOWE, an individual;
and MICHAEL JEFFREY HOWE, an
individual,

AMENDED COMPLAINT
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)
Civil No. 050906433

Plaintiffs,

Judge L.A. Dever

v.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
municipal corporation; SHANNA WERNER,
an individual; CHARLES F. "RICK" DINSE,
an individual; SCOTT ATKINSON, an
individual; JAMES BRYANT, an individual;
and JOHN DOES I - X, individuals.
Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, and as and for their
Amended Complaint against Defendants state and allege as follows:
Nature of Action
1.

This is an action to remedy deprivations of rights secured under the United States

and Utah Constitutions and other injuries to person and reputation at the hands of Salt Lake City
Corporation and its employees. As detailed below, Salt Lake City, its Police Department and
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particularly its Alarm Administrator, Shanna Werner, adopted a policy and engaged in a course
of conduct the purpose and effect of which were to stifle debate of an important public safety
issue by silencing one side of that debate. Among their wrongful and malicious acts, they
intentionally targeted Peak Alarm as a prominent presence and voice in the private security
industry; tarred Peak Alarm and the industry generally with false charges of dishonesty and
greed; arrested Peak Alarm's Central Station Manager on trumped-up criminal charges; and
pursued a groundless criminal prosecution until it was dismissed as wholly without merit.
Defendants have by their conduct maliciously tarnished Plaintiffs' reputation and interfered with
Peak Alarm's existing and prospective business relationships. They have also caused Plaintiffs
unnecessarily to incur legal fees and other damages. And they have systematically violated
Plaintiffs' civil rights, causing substantial personal and reputational damage. At a minimum,
Defendants have failed to properly train police officers and dispatchers in the meaning and
application of ordinances and statutes pertaining to false alarms, proximately causing damages
and injuries to Plaintiffs as set forth herein. Plaintiffs seek appropriate redress.
Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue
2.

Plaintiff Peak Alarm Company, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under

the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Peak
Alarm is a family-owned Salt Lake company. Its more than 250 employees provide private
security services to families, businesses and governmental entities throughout the State of Utah.
It works closely with public safety officials and it enjoys an excellent working relationship with
all of them, with the exception of Salt Lake City. Peak Alarm has been in business for more than
35 years, and has established an excellent reputation for providing the highest quality of reliable,
professional security services.
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3.

Plaintiff Jerry D. Howe ("Jerry Howe") is the founder and President of Peak

Alarm. Jerry Howe is and at all relevant times was a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Michael Jeffrey Howe ("Jeff Howe") was

the Central Station Manager of Peak Alarm. Jeff Howe is and at all relevant times was a resident
of Salt Lake County, Utah.
5.

Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation is a municipality organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Utah, and is a political subdivision therefore, which maybe sued in
its own name pursuant to law.
6.

Defendant Shanna Werner is an individual employed by Salt Lake City as Alarm

Coordinator, Management Services Division, Salt Lake City Police Department. In performance
of her official duties, Werner acts under color of state law. She is sued in both her individual and
official capacities.
7.

Defendant Charles F. "Rick" Dinse is an individual employed by Salt Lake City

as Chief of Police. In performance of his official duties, Dinse acts under color of state law. He
is sued in both his individual and official capacities.
8.

Defendant Scott Atkinson is an individual employed by Salt Lake City as

Assistant Chief of Police. In performance of his official duties, Atkinson acts under color of
state law. He is sued in both his individual and official capacities.
9.

Defendant James Bryant is employed by Salt Lake City as a police officer. In the

performance of his official duties, Bryant acts under color of state law. He is sued in both his
individual and official capacities.
10.

Defendant John Does I - X are individuals employed by Salt Lake City whose

names are currently unknown. They are sued in both their individual and official capacities.
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11.

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action matter under

Utah Code Ann.§ 78-3-4 and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-501. Venue is proper pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-13-2 and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-502(3).
12.

Plaintiffs served a Notice of Claim pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-

11(2) on or about June 25, 2004, complying in all respects with the applicable requirements of
the Governmental Immunities Act. Defendants acknowledged receipt of the Notice of Claim by
letter dated June 28, 2004, promising to "investigate this matter and respond accordingly." Salt
Lake City subsequently sought, and was granted, additional time beyond the deadline to
investigate the matter. However, the City has not made Plaintiffs aware of the results of any
investigation, nor has it provided any written response to Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim.
General Allegations
13.

Peak Alarm and others in the alarm industry in Utah and nationwide provide

valuable services, including alarm installation and on-site and remote monitoring. Alarms
occasionally go off by mistake or under other circumstances not involving a genuine emergency.
Peak Alarm and others in the industry have worked hard to reduce the number of such "false
alarms," and have developed and identified a number of sensible measures that can benefit both
public and private entities and employees charged with ensuring the public safety.
14.

At the same time, Peak Alarm and others have opposed measures that impose

burdensome or unworkable requirements on public and private entities and employees and
unreasonable risks on the public, without a corresponding public benefit. One such measure is
the "no-response" ordinance.
15.

"No-response" ordinances typically prevent law enforcement from responding to

a private alarm unless the alarm is visually corroborated or otherwise "verified" in some fashion.
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The alarm industry's general position is that "no-response" ordinances are at best ineffective and
can even derogate from important community efforts to increase public safety by increasing the
risk that genuine emergencies will not be addressed in a timely fashion.
16.

Jeff Howe is Jerry Howe's son and was, at all times relevant hereto, Peak Alarm's

Central Station Manager. His responsibilities as Central Station Manager included managing
proper dispatch in response to alarm signals and reducing the number of false alarms. His
position required that he be licensed by the State. His license can be revoked if he is convicted
of a crime.
17.

Besides his responsibilities as Peak Alarm's Central Station Manager, Jeff Howe

also served since early 2003 as Chairman of the No-Response Committee for the Utah Alarm
Association, an industry association that seeks to maximize the public benefit that can be
obtained from strong communication and coordination between public safety and private security
entities and employees. The No-Response Committee was formed in 2001 to develop and
publicly articulate and advocate the alarm industry's position on the important public safety
issues that arise when municipalities consider adopting "no-response" ordinances. Those issues
are multifarious but center on whether the public interest is well-served by "no-response"
ordinances or whether other means of insuring proper coordination between public safety
officials and private security providers better serve the public interest. In his capacity as
Chairman of the No-Response Committee, Jeff Howe has been a highly visible, articulate and
effective spokesperson for the alarm industry's position on those important issues.
18.

Salt Lake City, acting principally through Shanna Werner, the Alarm

Administrator for the City, has developed, adopted and publicly advocated a position on "noresponse" ordinances that differs from that of Peak Alarm and the alarm industry. Ms. Werner
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has not only concerned herself with Salt Lake City's "no-response" ordinance, but at the behest
and with the support of Salt Lake City and other employees, has become a nationwide
spokesperson for "no-response" ordinances and an anti-alarm-industry attack dog. Her tactics
and methods have included the development and implementation of a wide-ranging public
campaign that features exaggerated, misleading and/or false statements against the alarm
industry itself and individuals within the industry.
19.

For example, in media interviews, Ms. Werner has consistently painted the entire

alarm industry with a broad and damaging brush by relating isolated anecdotes involving the
alleged practices of a few companies:
a.

In comments published by KSL on or about April 22, 1999, Ms. Werner

characterized the entire alarm industry as "preying on [the] fears" of senior citizens,
"selling them this alarm system as the panacea for all ills."
b.

In a letter to the editor published in the Salt Lake Tribune on or about March 15,

2000, Ms. Werner criticized a paid ad by the Utah Alarm Association as using "tactics
typical of this industry to scare, bully, threaten."
c.

In comments published by the Wall Street Journal on or about April 28, 2000,

Ms. Werner cited alleged incidents where an alarm company sold an alarm to an elderly
blind woman who frequently set off the "panic" button when she meant to turn on her
system, and incurred heavy fines; a salesman told a homeowner his young daughters
could "disappear" if he didn't buy a security system; and a company continued to charge
monitoring fees to a homeowner after he had sold his house, and then charged the same
fees to the buyer, too. Ms. Warner concluded: "As far as I'm concerned, this whole
alarm business is a scam."
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d.

In a letter that appeared in the June 2002 issue of Security Sales magazine,

Ms. Werner stated: "It is so common within the alarm industry for emotion to take
control and a 'smoke-and-mirrors' approach to be used in an attempt to cloud the issue."
e.

In an October 2, 2002, email published to various third parties, Ms. Werner

alleged that an industry spokesperson had "grossly misrepresented the burglary statistics
for Salt Lake City Police Department" and threatened that publication of the
spokesperson's presentation "will result in litigation." Ms. Werner subsequently sent
emails to third persons throughout the United States warning them "to be cautious in
spreading the false statistics." In fact, the presentation referred to, entitled "Effective
Alarm Management," was based on statistics obtained directly from the Salt Lake City
Police Department website.
f.

In comments published by a Savannah newspaper on or about December 22,

2002, Ms. Werner contended: "They [the alarm industry] like to have free emergency
response, with no responsibility but to rake in that monthly monitoring fee."
g.

In comments published in an industry newsletter in July 2003, Ms. Werner is

quoted as stating: "This is an industry that is in complete denial about the reality of false
alarms."
h.

In a letter dated April 30, 2003, on Salt Lake City Corporation Police Department

letterhead, addressed to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, Ms. Werner alleged that
the alarm industry was attempting to engage in a "conspiracy" with an insurance
company involving "a plot to penalize their customers and other citizens" for their own
"political and economic gains." Ms. Werner went on to allege that the conspirators
sought "to defraud their customers in an attempt to force police to resume responding to
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an alarm signal that was 99.7% false." The Attorney General's office investigated Ms.
Werner's claims and concluded that "the facts on which [her] allegations were based are
incorrect." It also specifically advised her "to forward a copy of [the Attorney General's
response] to those people to whom you sent your original letter, so that the allegations in
your letter will not stand uncorrected." On information and belief, Ms. Werner did not do
so.
20.

Ms. Werner has also targeted Peak Alarm specifically. By letter dated March 21,

2002, on Salt Lake City Corporation Police Department letterhead, Ms. Werner addressed a Peak
Alarm customer, encouraging it to "consider selecting another company who will do a better job
for you."
21.

The purpose and effect of this campaign have been to unfairly and seriously

malign Peak Alarm and, as a result, to threaten the existing contracts and future business
prospects of Peak Alarm, and to send a chill over the expression of legitimate viewpoints on an
important matter of public interest.
22.

Ms. Werner, Sgt. Bryant and others acting in their individual and official

capacities on behalf of Salt Lake City have taken even more aggressive action in their campaign,
going well beyond vigorous advocacy and false and misleading statements to even more
egregiously illegal and unconstitutional actions. Specifically, Defendants decided to find or
create a situation based on which they could charge and prosecute a representative of the private
security industry for making a "false alarm," hoping to send a powerful message that would stifle
or silence opposition to their campaign for nationwide embrace of "no-response" ordinances and
inflict other serious damage. In pursuit of that plan, they targeted Jeff Howe and Peak Alarm.
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23.

Defendants' targeting of Peak Alarm and Jeff Howe arose out of the following

incident, as set forth in Findings of Fact entered by Judge Paul Iwasaki of the Salt Lake City
Justice Court on May 4, 2004.
a.

Peak has a contract with the Salt Lake City School District pursuant to which

Peak provides certain security services for District schools, including West High School.
These services include the use of remote motion sensoring alarms.
b.

On June 27, 2003, when school was not in session and no unauthorized

individuals were permitted on the premises, certain of the motion sensoring alarms were
activated at West High.
c.

Shortly thereafter, Diane Hoyt, an employee of the District, contacted Peak

concerning the alarms, which could be heard on the dispatch recording. She informed
Peak's dispatcher that there were two individuals in the school who had activated the
alarms and they were not authorized to be on the premises. She did not know who the
persons were or what their intentions were. When Peak's dispatcher asked if Ms. Hoyt
wanted her to dispatch the Salt Lake City police, Ms. Hoyt answered in the affirmative.
d.

Peak's dispatcher contacted Salt Lake City Police Dispatch and informed it of the

call from West High. The police dispatcher said Salt Lake Police would not respond to
the call, even though there had been visual confirmation of the two individuals, unless the
client itself made the call to Salt Lake City Police Dispatch.
e.

Shortly thereafter during the morning of June 27, 2003, Jeff Howe contacted Salt

Lake City Police Dispatch requesting that the Salt Lake City Police respond to the alarm
at West High, and informing police dispatch they had been unable to reestablish contact
with the client.
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f.

Shortly thereafter, several Salt Lake City Police officers arrived at West High and

attempted to intercede with what may have been a burglary in progress. However, the
two individuals reportedly inside West High had apparently exited the building by the
time the police arrived. At least, the police were unable to locate them. However, the
Salt Lake City police officer in charge of the investigation spoke with Ms. Hoyt who
again confirmed that two unauthorized individuals had entered the premises and set off
the alarms.
24.

Ms. Werner returned from a three-week absence to receive a phone call from

Sgt. Bryant and an office visit from Communications Supervisor Diane Powell advising her of
the above incident. Jeff Howe had sent Ms. Werner an email about the incident with audio clips
of the relevant conversations and had requested a return call. Ms. Werner declined, however, to
contact Mr. Howe or otherwise to further investigate the incident: "After listening to the
rationalization of his actions with Officer Wihongi [one of the Salt Lake City police officers who
responded to the incident], I felt a phone call to him would result in more of the rationalization
and justification of what I had already heard. The mistruth by Jeff Howe on the tape provided by
dispatch was very evident and I felt listening to more rhetoric was unnecessary." She also
referred to a prior incident where she claimed to have "experienced a similar mistruth from Jeff
Howe . . . several years ago."
25.

West High School received a false alarm fine in connection with the above

incident. Peak Alarm and Jeff Howe were treated much differently. Acting in concert with the
other Defendants and pursuant to the above-described policy and plan to bring a "test case," Ms.
Werner caused a criminal information to be filed against Jeff Howe, alleging he had committed
the criminal offense of violating the Utah State Code, Section 76-9-105(1), by making a false
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alarm - a crime punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of up to $1,000 plus an 85%
surcharge. Conviction on this charge threatened Jeffs licensure and ability to pursue his
livelihood. Merely bringing the charge, however, was intended to send and did send a broader,
chilling message to Peak Alarm and the entire private security industry: the full weight of the
criminal law will be brought to bear against those who publicly oppose "no-response"
ordinances.
26.

Defendants undertook to convey their message with unmistakable clarity. In a

highly unusual move, Defendants chose not to simply issue a citation; instead, Sgt. Bryant
himself, along with another Salt Lake Cit\ Police officer, personally served the citation on Jeff
Howe at Peak Alarm. Jeff Howe was summoned to the public reception area at Peak Alarm's
offices, told the officers had come to "arrest" him, and fingerprinted in front of employees and
others coming and going through the reception area. This spectacle caused him humiliation and
injury to his reputation.
27.

Following the filing of this meritless and vindictive criminal charge, Plaintiff

Jerry Howe sought and was granted a meeting with Defendants Dinse and Atkinson representing
the Salt Lake City Police Department. Jerry Howe's purpose was to gain an understanding of
whether Ms. Werner and others who engaged in the above-described conduct were acting on
their own initiative or with the express or tacit approval of the City. At that meeting, Defendants
Dinse and Atkinson made clear Ms. Werner was engaged in the above-described conduct under
their direction and with their authorization and approval.
28.

Salt Lake City vigorously pursued the prosecution of the charge notwithstanding

its lack of merit. The reason was that Defendants believed the prosecution offered the wishedfor "test case" of a new and more aggressive tactic by which they hoped to sway public opinion
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against private security companies like Peak Alarm and in favor of "no response" ordinances by
intimidating the industry opposition into silence. Ms. Werner confirmed this when she told the
Security System News that she "hoped Howe would be found guilty": "I'm hoping for the
enforcement of our ordinance that it goes well," she said. "If the jury lets Peak Alarm off the
hook, to me that's a signal to other alarm companies to call Salt Lake City police and tell them
whatever they want."
29.

Upon trial of the false alarm charge, Jeff Howe was not found guilty; instead, he

was granted a directed verdict without even having to put on his defense. Summarizing the
incident, Judge Iwasaki found as follows:
The witnesses and evidence presented by the City established that
there was an alarm at West High School, there were two
unauthorized individuals on the premises of West High School
which caused the alarm, and that no one knew what was the intent
of the individuals, including whether they intended to cause a theft
or commit a felony while in the West High School premises, and
that Mrs. Hoyt had asked for police assistance in removing the
individuals from the premises. The evidence presented above was
undisputed.
None of the evidence presented by the City established
Mr. Howe's intent at the time he contacted Salt Lake City Police
dispatch, nor was there any evidence presented by the City to
establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally made false
representations to Salt Lake City dispatch.
30.

Based on the foregoing facts, Judge Iwasaki concluded:
a.

The City has failed to produce any evidence establishing criminal intent.

b.

The City has not met the necessary elements to prove Mr. Howe violated

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1).
c.

There has been no evidence presented that Mr. Howe knowingly or

intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false alarm
as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1).
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d.

Accordingly, the defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict is hereby

granted.
31.

Defendants viewed the criminal charge against Jeff Howe and the subsequent

prosecution as a way to send a message to the broader industry that Ms. Werner, as part of the
City's official policy, had long targeted and tarred with broad-brush, unfair and defamatory
comments Their purpose was not to enforce the criminal laws, but to seek to punish Mr. Howe
for doing his job and exercising his constitutional rights, all in pursuit of the City's policy of
using the "false alarm" statutes or ordinances and other means at their disposal to create a "test
case" that would enshrine the City's position on "no-response" ordinances and silence those in
the opposition During the pendency of the criminal case, Defendant Werner even denied lawful
requests foi public information Jeff Howe needed to participate and share Peak's and the alarm
industry's point of view in city council meeting and other forums. Even though the criminal
charge against Jeff Howe was dismissed, the City's goal was realized. According to the Security
Systems News, one industry insider stated "There will be a seismic shift in the industry if this
prosecution is successful. And even if it is not, it still portends very bad things for the future of
alarm dispatching."
FIRST ( AUSE OF ACTION
(False Arrest/False Imprisonment against the individual defendants in their individual capacities)
32.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 31 of

this Complaint.
33.

Defendants acted, intending to confine or restrain Jeff Howe, by arresting him

thereby resulting in confinement and restraint.

-13'ynonn-is

t

1 on

34.

No reasonable and prudent person acting in good faith would be justified in

believing facts existed that would warrant the making of an arrest.
35.

At all relevant times, Defendants acted with a malicious intent to deprive Jeff

Howe of his constitutional rights.
36.

As a result of Defendants' actions, Jeff Howe has been harmed and damaged in an

amount to be proven at trial.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Malicious Prosecution against the individual defendants in their individual capacities)
37.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 36 of

this Complaint.
38.

Defendants caused a criminal proceeding to be initiated and continued against Jeff

39.

The criminal proceeding was terminated in Jeff Howe's favor.

40.

There was no probable cause for the proceeding, and the primary purpose was

Howe.

other than that of bringing the alleged offender to justice.
41.

Defendants commenced and continued the proceeding because of a malicious

intent to deprive Jeff Howe of his constitutional rights.
42.

As a result of Defendants' actions, Jeff Howe has been harmed and damaged in an

amount to be proven at trial.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of Constitutional Rights against all Defendants in their official and individual capacities)
43.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 42 of

this Complaint.
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44.

Defendants' conduct as herein alleged establishes violations of Plaintiffs' rights

under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in that
they consist of administrative and investigative functions that led to an unreasonable seizure of
Jeff Howe and a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, and in that they constitute
as well a substantive due process violation because of the degree of harm (including the loss of
his livelihood) they sought to inflict on Jeff Howe.
45.

As set forth above, Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation implemented and

executed an established policy, practice, custom or decision officially adopted or informally
accepted or condoned by the City and its officials and employees.
46.

Acting under color of state law, the individual Defendants engaged in the above-

described conduct pursuant to this policy, practice, custom or decision, acting with malice at all
relevant times. In the alternative, one or more individual Defendants failed to take action they
were required to take to properly supervise their subordinates and stop their unlawful and
malicious actions, in a manner that amounts to deliberate indifference.
47.

Pursuant to the policy and the individual actions pursuant thereto, and in addition

to the violations referred to above, Defendants intended to and did retaliate against Plaintiffs and
deprive, inhibit and punish their free exercise of rights granted under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution by seeking to restrain them from engaging in the constitutionally
protected activity of engaging in associations and expressing and advocating their viewpoint on
the subject of "no-response" ordinances while Salt Lake City remained free to express and
advocate its own competing viewpoint on the same subject, and by punishing them for
expressing their viewpoint. Defendants' actions were intended to and did chill persons of
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ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that constitutionally protected activity, and were
substantially motivated as a response to the Plaintiffs' exercise of that activity.
48.

Defendants' actions were a proximate cause of injuries and damages sustained by

Plaintiffs, such damages in an amount proven at trial.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of Utah Constitution - against all Defendants
in their individual and official capacities)
49.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 48 of

this Complaint.
50.

Defendants' conduct as herein alleged establishes violations of Plaintiffs' rights

under Article I Sections 1, 7, 14 and 15 of the Utah Constitution.
51.

Defendants' actions were a proximate cause of injuries and damages sustained by

Plaintiffs, such damages in an amount proven at trial.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government A c t against the individual defendants in their individual capacities)
52.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 51 of

this Complaint.
53.

Defendants initiated and continued a cause of action relating to or in response to

an act of Jeff Howe while participating in the process of government.
54.

Defendants acted without a substantial basis in fact or law, and for the purpose of

harassing, intimidating, punishing, and otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of
rights granted under the United States and Utah Constitutions.
55.

As a result of Defendants1 actions, Jeff Howe has been harmed and damaged in an

amount to be proven at trial.
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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Tortious Interference With Existing And Prospective Business Relations against the individual defendants in their individual capacities)
56.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 55 of

this Complaint.
57.

Defendants knew of Jeff Howe's employment and Peak Alarm's existing and

prospective business relations.
58.

Defendants intentionally interfered with that employment and those relations for

improper purposes or through improper means, causing economic damage to Peak Alarm and to
Jeff Howe.
59.

Defendants acted at all relevant times with a malicious intent.

60.

As a result of Defendants' actions, Jeff Howe and Peak Alarm have been harmed

and damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Defamation — against Werner in her individual capacity)
61.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 60 of

this Complaint.
62.

Werner's representations to the media, to current and prospective Peak Alarm

customers, and to other third parties, as detailed above, constitute defamation per se, in that they
imply conduct incompatible with the operation of a lawful business, trade or profession. They
also impeach Peak Alarm's and Jeff Howe's honesty, integrity, and reputation and expose them
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
63.

Werner's representations were false and misleading, and were known by Werner

to be false and misleading, or were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.
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64.

Werner's representations were false, unprivileged, and have caused Plaintiffs to

lose business.
65.

Werner has acted at all relevant times with a malicious intent.

66.

By reason of Werner's defamatory statements, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an

amount to be proven at trial.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distressagainst the individual defendants in their individual capacities)
67.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 66 of

this Complaint
68.

Defendants' conduct, as described above, is outrageous in that it offends generally

accepted standards of decency and morality.
69.

Defendants intended to cause emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard

of the probability of causing emotional distress.
70.

Jeff Howe has suffered emotional distress including mental anguish, grief, and

shame, which distress was proximately caused by Defendants' outrageous conduct.
71.

At all relevant times, Defendants acted with a malicious intent.

72.

By reason of Defendants7 outrageous conduct, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an

amount to be proven at trial.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights against the individual defendants in their individual capacities)
73.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 72 of

this Complaint.
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74.

Defendants, in the manner and by the methods described above, have engaged in

a civil conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.
75.

On information and belief, Defendants came to a meeting of the minds regarding

their objectives.
76.

Defendants have engaged, collectively or individually, in one or more overt

unlawful acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including but not limited to:
a. False arrest/false imprisonment, as set forth and alleged above;
b. Malicious prosecution, as set forth and alleged above;
c. Deprivation of constitutional rights, as set forth and alleged above;
d. Violation of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, as set forth and
alleged above;
e. Tortious interference with existing and prospective business relations, as set forth
and alleged above;
f.

Defamation, as set forth and alleged above; and

g. Intentional infliction of emotional distress, as set forth and alleged above.
77.

As a direct and proximate result of these defendants' civil conspiracy, Plaintiffs

have suffered economic injury and loss.
78.

Defendants acted at all relevant times with a malicious intent.

79.

By reason of Defendants' outrageous conduct, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an

amount to be proven at trial.
Tenth Cause of Action
(Negligence - against Defendant Salt Lake City)
80.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 79 of

this Complaint.
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81.

Defendants, as public employees, have a duty to individuals and entities such as

Plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care in the performance of their duties, including the
interpretation, application and enforcement of city ordinances and state statutes.
82.

At a minimum, Defendants Werner, Bryant and others failed to exercise

reasonable care in the performance of their duties, in that, among other things, they failed to
exercise reasonable care in the interpretation, application and/or enforcement of City ordinances
and/or state statutes.
83.

Defendants' negligent acts and omissions proximately caused injuries to

Plaintiffs, as set forth above.
84.

Defendant Salt Lake City is liable for injuries proximately cause to Plaintiffs by

its employees' negligent acts or omissions committed within the scope of their employment.
WHERFORR, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
1.

A judgment against Defendants for the legal fees and costs incurred in the defense

of Jeff Howe's criminal proceeding plus lost wages, totaling an amount not less than $33,213.72,
plus interest.
2.

In addition to out-of-pocket damages, Plaintiffs seek all other damages allowed by

law in an amount currently unknown but believed to be not less than $100,000.00, plus punitive
damages as may be appropriate based on the malicious nature of the conduct alleged.
3.

Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief, and their attorneys' fees and

costs incurred in the prosecution of this action.
4.

Plaintiffs pray for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and

appropriate.
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DATED this J

da
day of September, 2005.
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC

Ten C. Clark
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs' Address:
1504 South Gladiola
Salt Lake City, Utah 84127-0127

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the

3

day of September, 2005, I caused to be mailed,

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT to the
following:
Morris O Haggerty
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney
Room 505, City and County Building
451 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Wesley Robinson
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney
Room 505, City and County Building
451 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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5.08.020

Definitions:

A. "Alarm business" means any persons engaged in the business of selling, installing, planning
the installation, assisting in planning the installation, servicing, maintaining, monitoring,
repairing, replacing, moving or removing alarm systems in the city.
B. "Alarm administrator" means the individual designated by the chief of police to issue permits
and enforce the provisions of this title.
C. "Alarm dispatch request" means a notification to the police by the alarm business that an
alarm, either manual or automatic, has been activated at a particular alarm site.
D. "Alarm site" means a single premises or location served by an alarm system or systems.
Each tenancy, if served by a separate alarm system in a multitenant building or complex,
shall be considered a separate alarm site.
E. "Alarm system" means any mechanism, equipment, or device which is designated to detect
an unauthorized entry into any building or onto any property, or to direct attention to a
robbery, burglary, or other emergency in progress, and to signal the above occurrences
either by a local or audible alarm or by a silent or remote alarm. The following devices shall
not constitute alarm systems within the meaning of this subsection:
1. Devices, which do not register alarms that are audible, visible, or perceptible outside the
protected premises;
2. Devices which are not installed, operated or used for the purpose of reporting an
emergency to the police department;
3. Alarm devices installed on a temporary basis by the police department.
F. "Alarm user" means the person, occupant, firm, partnership, association, corporation,
company or organization of any kind in control of any building, structure or facility or portion
thereof wherein an alarm system is maintained.
G. "Apartment building" means any building containing two (2) or more rental units.
H. "Automatic dialing device" means an alarm system which automatically sends over regular
telephone lines, by direct connection or otherwise, a prerecorded voice-message indicating
the existence of an emergency situation that the alarm system is designed to detect.
I. "Central station" means an office to which alarm systems are connected, where operators
supervise the circuits on a continuous basis, and where there is a subsequent relaying of
such messages by a live voice to the police department.
J. "Duress alarm" means a silent alarm signal generated by the manual activation of a device
intended to signal a crisis situation requiring police response.
K. "Emergency" means the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, burglary or
other criminal action.
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L. "Employee" means any person who is employed by an alarm business and who sells,
installs, services, maintains, repairs, or replaces alarm systems in the city.
M. "False alarm" means the activation of an alarm system, which results in an arrival at the
alarm site by the police department where an emergency does not exist. It includes an
alarm signal caused by conditions of nature, which are normal for that area. "False alarm"
does not include an alarm signal caused by extraordinarily violent conditions of nature such
as tornadoes, floods and earthquakes.
N. "Holdup alarm" means a silent alarm signal generated by the manual activation of a device
intended to signal a robbery in progress.
O. "Intrusion alarm system" means an alarm system signaling an entry or attempted entry into
the area protected by the system.
P. "Local alarm" means any alarm device audible at the alarm site.
Q. "One Plus duress alarm" means the manual activation of a silent alarm signal by entering at
a keypad a code that adds one to the last digit of the normal arm/disarm code (e.g., normal
code = 1234; One Plus duress code = 1225).
R. "Panic alarm" means an audible alarm system signal generated by the manual activation of
a device intended to signal a life threatening or emergency situation requiring law
enforcement response.
S. "Permittee" means the person to whom an alarm user permit is issued.
T. "Person" means and includes natural persons, without regard to number or gender, and any
partnership, corporation, and any other type of legal entity.
U. "Private guard responder" means a private guard company, an alarm company's guard, an
alarm user, or a person or entity appointed by an alarm user to be responsible to confirm
that an attempted or actual crime has occurred at an alarm site. (Ord. 64-00 § 1, 2000)
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5.08.095

False Alarms:

A. Except for alarms at a wholesale or retail firearms business, intrusion alarm response shall
be dispatched by the police department only after a private guard responder has confirmed
that an attempted or actual crime has occurred at the alarm site.
B. A one hundred fifty dollar ($150.00) penalty per incident shall be charged to a central station
or alarm company for each request for police response from a duress, panic or holdup
alarm where no valid alarm user permit is provided to police dispatch by the central station.
Police response to duress alarms shall be limited to alarms originating from a stationary
building structure.
C. Any false information provided to the alarm administrator or to police dispatch by any alarm
user, central station, alarm company, or private guard responder may be a crime under
section 11.04.090 or 11.04.100 of this code and shall be dealt with accordingly.
D. Activation of a duress, panic, or holdup alarm which is determined to be false by the police
department shall result in an assessment of a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100.00) for
the first, one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) for the second, two hundred fifty dollars
($250.00) for the third, three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) for the fourth, and four hundred
fifty dollars ($450.00) for the fifth, and each additional false alarm within each three
hundred sixty five (365) day period. Each false intrusion alarm shall result in an
assessment of a one hundred dollar ($100.00) penalty. The alarm user shall be responsible
for false alarms caused by any person having authorized access to the premises from the
alarm user.
E. All penalties assessed under this chapter shall be due and payable on the date written
notice of any penalty due is issued. Any penalty, which is paid within thirty (30) days of the
due date, shall be reduced by fifty dollars ($50.00). Any penalty, which is paid after thirty
(30) days and within sixty (60) days of the due date, shall be reduced by twenty five dollars
($25.00). Any penalty paid after sixty (60) days from the due date shall not be reduced. If
any penalty is not paid within ninety (90) days of the due date, the city may use such lawful
means as are available to collect such penalties. In the event the city files an action in court
to recover such penalties, the city shall be entitled to recovery of its costs and attorney fees
in addition to the penalties due and owing.
F. The alarm administrator may implement a false alarm prevention course. The course shall
inform alarm users of the problems created by false alarm dispatches and how users may
operate an alarm system without generating false alarm dispatches. Users who complete
the course shall be issued a certificate worth the dismissal of one false alarm penalty of up
to one hundred dollars ($100.00). No permittee shall be entitled to take such course and
receive a penalty waiver more than once per year. (Ord. 64-00 § 1, 2000)
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